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ABSTRACT 
This work applies geopolitical concepts to elucidate how geography, energy, and 
rivalries among global powers affect the Azeri foreign policy. This research work uses a 
deductive method of qualitative research and a longitudinal analysis of qualitative 
variables. 
This study first reviews the most significant academic works in the field to delineate 
the framework of Azerbaijani foreign policy. Next, it discusses the geographical features of 
the Azeri landlocked territory and its influence over foreign policy. Then the study presents 
how Azerbaijan uses its energy as a leverage tool in its foreign policy. The fourth chapter 
analyzes the current competition between two global powers, the US and Russia, for 
influence over Azeri oil and gas resources, seeking to balance the power in the South 
Caucasus and Central Asian regions.  
Finally, this research work lists the findings, showing that the Azeri foreign policy is 
affected by geography, energy, and global power competition variables. The transit states 
that encircle the landlocked territory of Azerbaijan reduce the Azeri ability to export its 
energy resources to international markets. The economic and political involvement of 
foreign companies and states in the Azeri energy industry also reduces the economic and 
political independence of Azerbaijan. The competition between the US and Russia for 
influence over the Azeri territory and its energy resources also affects the foreign policy of 
Azerbaijan. Thus, in order to achieve economic, political, and military stability, Azerbaijan 
has to be constantly balancing regional and global powers. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Azerbaijan and Global Background 
Two principal political and economic changes occurred in the last decades of the 
20th century, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. 
As a result of those changes, the United States (US) consolidated its supremacy in the world 
and Russia lost its status as a superpower. Since the competition between the US and the 
Soviet Union was no longer possible, international institutions acquired more importance 
in international affairs. The end of the bipolar world, however, did not represent a 
complete change in the relationship among states in international politics because the 
relationship between the US and the Western powers—such as Great Britain, France, and 
Germany—remained virtually intact.1  
The end of the Soviet Union consolidated the institution-building process designed 
by the US at the end of the Second World War and defined the current global order.2 
Washington created an economic, political, and legal framework for fluent interaction 
between states and multilateral institutions in economic, political, and military affairs.3 
                                                 
1 The end of the Cold War has meant the end of the bipolar order and the containment of the Soviet Union. 
The basic Western liberal principles and organizations endured and became more robust than before. John G. 
Ikenberry, "The Myth of Postwar Chaos," Foreign Affairs 75 (1996): 79-91. 
Democracies endured and even became more robust than before. John G. Ikenberry After Victory: Institutions, 
Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
2000), 215. 
2 Ikenberry, "Postwar Chaos," 79-91. 
3 International organizations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), the North American Free Agreement Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the World Trade Organization (WTO) reinforced the 
new global economy, rule of law, and military order. John G. Ikenberry, "Globalization as American 
Hegemony," In Globalization Theory: Approaches and Controversies, ed. David Held and Anthony McGrew:  
2 
Thus, international cooperation among states and institutions became the new common 
practice for international relations. States were no longer unique actors in international 
relations because globalization reshaped global political, economic, and military affairs.4  
In recent decades, the intensification of the interconnection between economic, 
ecological, political, and security affairs has affected the decision-making process in world 
politics. Cooperation increased its importance as a tool to mitigate the contradictions of the 
new global economy. In other words, societies constituted as nation-states are ‘opening’ 
themselves to an economically driven world society,5 where world connectivity and 
interdependence are the most significant manifestation of the global economy.6  
Under this framework, the Republic of Azerbaijan has become a critical country 
where power competition between Western and non-Western states takes place. This work 
attempts to explain how geographic features, energy resources, and global powers’ 
competition for influence in the region of Azerbaijan can affect the independence of Azeri 
foreign policy.  
                                                                                                                                                             
(Cambridge: Polity, 2007): 41-61. John G. Ikenberry, "American Power and the Empire of Capitalist 
Democracy." Review of International Studies 27 (2001): 191-212. Ikenberry, After Victory, 216. 
4Globalization is “a process or set of processes which embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of 
social relations and transactions –assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and impact- 
generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction, and the exercise of 
power.”  David Held et al., Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, and Culture (Palo Alto: Stanford 
University Press, 1999), 16. 
5 Jürgen Habermas, The Postnational Constellation (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), 61.  
6This new economic and political approach claims that Western legal, economic, and military supremacy over 
non-Western states is unparalleled. See: Sophie Bessis, Occidente y los Otros: Historia de una Supremacia 
(Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 2002), 17. 
Cox, Robert. “Democracy in Hard Times : Economic Globalization and the Limits to Liberal Democracy.” In The 
Transformation of Democracy? Globalization and Territorial Democracy, edited by Anthony McGrew 
(London: The Open University Press, 1997),49. 
3 
1.1.1 Geography  
Azerbaijan is a landlocked territory bordering Russia to the north, Iran to the south, 
Armenia and Georgia to the west, and the Caspian Sea to the east. The Azeri region of 
Nakhchevan is also landlocked, encircled by Iran to the south and west, Armenia to the 
north and east, and Turkey to the northwest. The collapse of the Soviet Union presented a 
new and complex reality for Azerbaijan, which left behind its Soviet history to become an 
independent state, assuming economic and geopolitical challenges. Economically speaking, 
Azerbaijan was not able to reduce its economic dependency from Russia when it became an 
independent state due to its lack of infrastructure and industry. Under Soviet rule, Azerbaijan did 
not develop either its national industry or alternative routes to transport its products, which 
consolidated its economic dependency on the Soviet Union. The existing transport routes that 
connect Azerbaijan with the outside world were in bad condition, and their lack of maintenance 
increased the transport costs of the Azeri commodities to international markets. These unrepaired 
highways connect the Azeri capital, Baku, with the Georgian port of Batumi in the Red Sea and 
with the Russian Southern Federal District of Rostovna-Donu, which also has access to the Red 
Sea through different Russians highways. The high cost of maintenance of the Azeri highways 
and the region’s singular geographic features have limited the commerce between Azerbaijan 
and the international world.
7
  
The development of the railway in the late 19
th
 Century represented an alternative to 
transport Azeri freight to Georgia, Armenia, Russia, Turkey, and the Red Sea. During the Soviet 
era, the railway gained more significance as the major transport system for people and goods. 
                                                 
7 Frederik Coene, The Caucasus: An Introduction (New York: Routledge, 2010), 21. 
4 
However, the end of the Soviet Union and the constant military conflicts among the Caucasus 
states reduced the transport of commodities by railway.
8
 For instance, a railway network that 
runs from Azerbaijan to Armenia and then to Turkey is not currently operating due to the 
economic blockade made by Azerbaijan against Armenia, in response to the military conflict 
between the two countries over the Azeri territory of Nagorno-Karabakh.
9
 The collapse of the 
Soviet Union also affected the commerce throughout railways between the South Caucasus states 
and Russia, reducing the traffic and trade by almost 80 percent of the regular freight.  After the 
end of the Soviet Empire, Azeri authorities, multilateral development banks, and private 
companies invested in the rehabilitation and maintenance of both transport systems, highways 
and railways, due to their importance for Azeri economic development. 
The geographical features of Azerbaijan and the other South Caucasus countries have 
made a buffer zone for the Russian, Persian, and Ottoman empires. The economic, political, and 
military ambition of those empires changed over time, and those changes influenced the current 
South Caucasus states’ foreign policies. Azerbaijan, for instance, has been considered a 
peripheral state within the Soviet centralized economic system, but its peripheral classification 
changed after the collapse of the Soviet Union when Western states and private companies 
became interested in the Azeri energy resources and its geostrategic location. The incursion of 
these new players increased the great powers’ competition for influence, and it also reshaped the 
foreign policy of Azerbaijan. The Azeri government had to deal with traditional powerful 
neighbors—Russia, Iran, and Turkey—leading Azerbaijan to develop a more sophisticated 
multilateral foreign policy to include the new economic, political, and military Western partners. 
                                                 
8 Coene, The Caucasus, 22. 
9 The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict lasted from 1988 until 1994, leaving20,000 dead and over 1 million 
refugees and displaced persons. Coene, The Caucasus, 145. 
5 
The Azeri authorities found that cooperation was the key strategy to achieve national and 
regional stability in the South Caucasus region, and they pursued a strategy of balancing global 
and regional power competition  
In geopolitical terms, Azerbaijan is crucial for regional and global powers. Halford 
Mackinder stated that the world history is a struggle for power and for the dominance of 
land and sea. Referring to Eurasia (the South Caucasus and Central Asian regions), he claimed 
that land would predominate over sea, and it would be due to the importance of Eurasia as a 
physical link between Europe and Asia, where significant natural resources and big populations 
would ensure the economic and military development of the state that succeeds in dominating the 
Eurasian region. The hegemonic position of a European or Asian state would be gained by 
control of the Eurasian landmass.  
According to Mackinder’s analysis, the geographic location of the Eurasian states has 
been crucial for the expansionism of Western and Russian powers. Over time, these global 
powers have increased and redefined their economic, political, and military interests over the 
South Caucasus and Central Asian countries. The most recent approach made by the US and 
Russia within these regions occurred after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when both powers 
began their competition for influence over Azeri energy resources. This competition for 
influence, in a global perspective, represented an opportunity for the Azeri government to take 
advantage of its geographical location to balance these two global powers. 
Under the president Heydar Aliyev’s government, Azerbaijan attempted to reduce its 
dependency on Russia by strengthening political, economic, and military ties with Western 
countries, especially with the US. During Bill Clinton’s presidency, the American government 
and the major American oil companies made significant investments in the oil and gas industry 
6 
of Azerbaijan, financing the development of new oil and gas pipelines, which run from 
Azerbaijan to Western markets through Georgia and Turkey.  This international partnership 
sought to reduce the Azeri dependency on the Russian pipeline network by creating alternative 
pipeline routes to export the Azeri energy resources to international markets. It also benefited 
Western countries because they become new consumers of the Azeri oil and gas, and it allowed 
European states to diversify their energy suppliers, decreasing their energy dependency on 
Russia and the Middle East. 
The geographical location of the Azeri territory is not only a matter of American and 
Russian competition for influence over Azerbaijan, but it is also a matter of regional struggle for 
power between Turkey and Iran. Both countries have sought to improve their economic, 
political, and military relations with Azerbaijan, using different means to ensure their economic 
involvement in the Azeri energy industry. Turkey and Iran intensified their competition for 
influence when the two major regional powers joined the US and Russian approach to the Azeri 
energy resources, respectively. Since Turkey developed a pro-Western policy, the Turkish-Azeri 
relationship is smoother and stronger than the Azeri-Iranian relationship. Turkey supported 
Azerbaijan during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict while Iran sided with Armenia, and the 
political and military support strengthened Turkey-Azerbaijan relations and weakened 
Azerbaijan’s relations with Iran. The pro-Western economic policy of Azerbaijan and Turkey 
allowed them to materialize energy projects for the exploitation and commercialization of Azeri 
oil and gas. Two of the most prominent industrial projects sponsored by the US government and 
the major Western oil companies in the South Caucasus region were the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
(BTC) oil pipeline and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) gas pipeline. These pipelines diversified 
the Azeri oil and gas routes by transporting its energy resources from the Caspian Sea to 
7 
international markets through Georgia and Turkey. The development of these alternative routes 
to the existing Russian oil and gas pipelines decreased the Azeri economic dependency on 
Russia, and it also represented an opportunity to reduce the impact that geography has over the 
landlocked territory of Azerbaijan. 
In addition to the global and regional powers’ interests in the Azeri geographical location, 
Azerbaijan has dealt with the challenges that its neighbor states, Georgia and Armenia, represent 
for Azeri economic development. The geographical position of Azerbaijan in the South Caucasus 
reduces the Azeri chances of becoming a fully independent state in political and economic terms. 
As a landlocked territory, Azerbaijan had to negotiate possible outlets to the sea with Georgia 
and Armenia, which became transit states for Azeri energy resources. Even though Armenia 
represented an excellent candidate for becoming an official transit state for the Azeri oil and gas, 
due to its proximity to Turkey and the Mediterranean Sea, Azerbaijan chose Georgia after the 
military confrontation between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the Azeri region of Nagorno-
Karabakh.  
Most of the Western countries supported the Azerbaijan-Georgia partnership in the 
commercialization of the Azeri energy resources. Georgia, once it became an independent state, 
developed a pro-Western foreign policy, which helped it to gain strategic allies in the Western 
hemisphere. Georgia became an important link between Western states and Azerbaijan, and it 
allowed the Azeri government to gain economic benefits from the Western powers, especially 
from the US and the EU. Military conflicts in Georgia and Azerbaijan increased the political and 
economic instability in the South Caucasus region, and these states have attempted to reduce this 
instability by increasing their security through partnerships with Western powers.  
8 
In the case of Georgia, Georgian authorities sought to consolidate economic, political, 
and military ties with the US, showing its pro-Western tendencies, which created concerns 
within Russia. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, did not go as far as Georgia did regarding its 
Western partnerships. Azerbaijan improved its political and economic relationship with the US, 
but it also sought to strengthen its political and economic ties with Russia, seeking to balance 
both global powers to Azerbaijan’s benefit. 
In brief, the geographical features of Azerbaijan have played an important role in Azeri 
economics, politics, and defense. On one side, the landlocked territory of Azerbaijan has limited 
its economic and political development due to its lack of outlets to international seas, increasing 
the influence of Russia and its South Caucasus neighbors over Azeri policies. On the other hand, 
the location of Azerbaijan increases the interests of Western powers to exploit and 
commercialize the Azeri energy resources, and it represented an opportunity for Azerbaijan to 
commercialize its oil and gas to international markets regardless the Azeri geographical factors. 
The conjunction of these two factors (the limitations and the opportunities produced by 
landlocked features of the Azeri territory) affected the foreign policy of Azerbaijan on different 
levels.  Therefore, the Azeri government realized that its geographical constraints could only be 
overcome by developing a multi-vector policy
10
 based on multiple pipelines, 11 which would 
                                                 
10
 The “multi-vector foreign policy” is a Russian phrase used to describe the balance of power. The Balance of 
power seeks to ensure equilibrium of power in which case no one state is threatened by a hegemonic state. 
Although the balance of power seeks to prevent rise of a hegemon state, it does not mean that states follow 
anti-hegemonic alliances because there would be the case where two sets of alliances will become a 
competing alliances that establish a balance of power, as Richard Little argues. Within the realism tradition, 
Classic Realism claims that the state as the key actor in international politics must pursue power. Hans J. 
Morgenthau argues, “International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power” and that struggle has its 
roots in human nature (competition, fear and war). On the other hand, Structural Realism argues that it is not 
human nature but the anarchical system that creates insecurity in the international politics. Structural 
realists believe that security/power competition depends on the lack of predominant authority above states. 
Kenneth Waltz claims that states are security maximizers because their major concern is not power but 
9 
increase the Azeri economic possibilities to become a more independent country in a region 
where global powers compete for influence. 
1.1.2 Energy 
As the previous section described at length, Azerbaijan is a landlocked territory, with 
energy resources that are exported through Georgia and Turkey to reach international markets. 
The transportation of the Azeri oil and gas has increased the power of these transit states over the 
Azeri foreign policy.12 Georgia became a key element within the Azeri and Western states’ 
energy businesses, especially since the Azeri government and Western oil companies decided to 
build oil and gas pipelines that would avoid Armenian territory due to the Azeri-Armenian 
military confrontation over Nagorno-Karabakh. These pipeline projects positively affected the 
Georgian economy, decreasing Georgia’s energy dependency on Russia. Azerbaijan became an 
energy supplier of Georgia, the US, and European states. It encouraged some Europeans to 
speculate about the possibility of including Georgia in NATO, and Georgia, as a transit state, 
obtained economic revenues for the transit fee of the Azeri oil and gas. Under these 
circumstances, the Azeri government developed and strengthened economic and political ties 
                                                                                                                                                             
security. John Mearsheimer, on the other hand, disagrees with Walt’s theoretical approach, claiming that an 
anarchical system encourages states to maximize their relative power position. This approach, called 
offensive realism, highlights that states are constantly seeking to gain power at the expense of other states, 
and it means that global power completion will be the rule in the international system where there would not 
be a global hegemon. Little, Richard. The balance of power in International relations. Metaphors, myths and 
models. (London: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 4 Dunne, Tim, and Brian C Schmidt. "Realism." In The 
Globalization of World Politics: An introduction to international relations, edited by John Baylis, Steve Smith 
and Patricia Owens. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p.106 
11 Avinoam Idan and Brenda Shaffer, “The Foreign Policies of Post-Soviet Landlocked States,” Post-Soviet 
Affairs 27 (2011): 241-68.  
12 Idan and Shaffer, “Post-Soviet Landlocked States,” 241. 
10 
with Georgia in order to ensure transportation of its energy resources to international markets 
through Georgian territory.  
In addition, Azerbaijan found a second crucial economic partner in Turkey, which 
became a transit state for the Azeri oil and gas sold to Western countries. The geographical 
location of Turkey is decisive for Azeri economic interests, especially since Azerbaijan has 
no outlet to the sea, while Turkey, located in the Mediterranean Sea, has direct access to the 
Western markets. The Azeri-Turkish relations reinforced Baku independence from 
Moscow, and they increased the Azeri-Turkish economic interdependence since part of the 
oil and gas that Azerbaijan exports through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the 
Baku-Tbilisi- Erzurum gas pipeline satisfies the Turkish local consumption,13 expanding the 
distribution of Azeri energy resources to regional and global markets. 
In a global context, Azeri energy resources are essential for global powers and 
European states, which have been seeking to decrease their energy dependency on Russia 
and the Middle East. This reality created an excellent opportunity for the Azeri government 
to trade its oil and gas with Western states, which have been attempting to diversify their 
energy suppliers. The commercialization of the Azeri energy resources to Western markets 
has decreased the Russian influence over Western countries due to the loss of Russia’s 
monopoly of the gas supply to Western states. 
Russia increased its concern over Azerbaijan when the American government and 
private companies participated actively in the trade and exploitation of the Azeri energy 
                                                 
13 It allows Turkey to diversify its oil and gas dependence from Libya and Russia respectively. Ali 
Karaosmanoglu. “Turkey’s Objectives in the Caspian Region,” In The Security of the Caspian Sea Region, ed. 
Gennady Chufrin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 153. 
11 
resources. Since then, Russian authorities have been very active dealing with Azeri leaders 
in order to maintain Russia’s predominant position as a hegemonic power in the South 
Caucasus region. 
The US, on the other hand, has watched closely the political, economic, and military 
development of Azerbaijan and Georgia since they became independent states. The initial 
American approach to Azerbaijan reflected the economic interests that the Western oil 
companies had in the early 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Once these 
companies obtained data about the size of the Azeri energy resources, they decided to 
invest millions of dollars to exploit and transport the Caspian oil and gas to international 
markets. The magnitude of the investment and the geopolitical features of Azerbaijan 
persuaded the US government to get involved in the negotiation of the different oil and gas 
pipelines that would take the Azeri energy resources to international markets.14 
Washington realized that the development of oil and gas pipelines that avoid Russian and 
Iranian territories would decrease the influence of these two states in the South Caucasus. 
It would also allow the Western states to decrease their energy dependency from Russia. 
Thus, Azeri energy resources play a crucial role in determining the foreign policy of 
Azerbaijan, especially since global and regional powers compete for influence over Azeri 
energy resources.  
                                                 
14 Ehsan Ahrari. “The Strategic Future of Central Asia: A View from Washington,” Journal of International 
Affairs 56 (2003): 157-166. 
12 
1.1.3 Competition among Powers 
In the early 1990’s, the territorial and ethnic conflict in the Azeri region of Nagorno-
Karabakh affected the political and economic stability of Azerbaijan.15 This instability 
represented an opportunity that allowed Western states to get involved in a military 
conflict within the Russian sphere of influence through the internationalization of the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.16 After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, 
Washington reinforced its participation in the South Caucasus region by seeking access to 
military facilities to conduct military attacks over Afghan territory during the War on 
Terror. 
Russia and Western powers have competed for influence in the South Caucasus 
region, and Azerbaijan represented the key state for this competition due to the Azeri 
geographical location and energy resources. The competition among global powers over 
Azerbaijan has followed two different perspectives: the American and the Russian. Under 
the American perspective, Washington has attempted to reduce Russian influence over the 
South Caucasus and Central Asian regions, reduce the EU dependence on Russian energy 
supply, spread politically and economically liberal values in the region, and increase the 
American influence in Azerbaijan through economic and military support. On the other 
                                                 
15 Gayane Novilova, “Unresolved Conflicts in the Regional Security System: The Case of the South Caucasus,” 
Transition Studies Review 11 (2004): 213-23. 
16 Alexander Krylov, “The Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict,”. in The Security of the Caspian Sea Region, Gennady 
Chufrin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 281-94. Dina Malysheva, “The Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh: 
Its Impact on Security in the Caspian Region,”. In The Security of the Caspian Sea Region, ed. Gennady Chufrin 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 257-80. Sabit Bagirov. “Azerbaijan’s Strategic Choice in the Caspian 
Region,” In The Security of the Caspian Sea Region, ed. Gennady Chufrin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001), 178-94. Alexander Rondeli, “The Choice of Independent Georgia,” In The Security of the Caspian Sea 
Region, ed. Gennady Chufrin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 195-211. 
 
13 
hand, the Russia has sought to consolidate its position as a superpower, increase Russian 
influence in the South Caucasus and Central Asian regions, discourage NATO expansion in 
the South Caucasus region, and take part in the Azeri energy business to improve Russia’s 
status as a major energy supplier. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan sought to increase its economic 
and military independence from Russia, seeking partnerships with Western states, 
especially with the US. Azeri authorities noticed that by balancing the US and Russia, 
Azerbaijan would be able to achieve political, economic, and military stability in the South 
Caucasus region. The global powers’ competition for influence over Azerbaijan would play 
in favor of Azeri interests, but it also would affect the economic development of Azerbaijan 
whether Russia and the US plays against Azerbaijan. Therefore, the Russian and American 
foreign policies in the South Caucasus are determining factors for Azerbaijan’s foreign 
policy.  
1.2 Thesis 
The economic repercussions for landlocked states is a topic widely developed in the 
political science field, but the potential influence of the landlocked geographic condition in 
foreign policy is still an undeveloped subject. 17 The existence of substantial energy 
resources would likely increase the wealth and independence of any state, but in the case of 
Azerbaijan its geographic features, as a landlocked state, affect its political and economic 
independence. Since energy resources became crucial commodities for industrialized 
                                                 
17 Idan and Shaffer, “Post-Soviet Landlocked States,” 24. 
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countries, global powers are likely to ensure the supply of oil and gas for their 
consumption. In addition to these two variables (geography and energy), the competition 
among global powers for influence over Azerbaijan is another variable to consider in the 
analysis of the independence of Azeri foreign policy. Thus, this thesis attempts to show the 
pragmatic face of Azeri policy by explaining Azerbaijan’s energy resources and landlocked 
geography make it dependent on regional neighbors for trade and a target for exploitation 
by Russia and the West.  Azerbaijan has managed to both profit from its resources by 
selling to both the US and Russia, and Baku uses this balance to hold back attempts by 
either major power to exert too much control over Azeri governance.” 
1.3 Significance of Research 
Recent works on the South Caucasus and Central Asia have attempted to explain the 
economic importance of geopolitics to decision makers, but they did not examine how 
independent Azeri foreign policy can be despite its landlocked geography. This work 
attempts to explain how the landlocked feature of Azerbaijan affects the independence of 
its foreign policy. To develop a more complete analysis of this claim, this study accounts for 
energy resources and global powers’ competition for influence in Azerbaijan. Thus, this 
study’s claims attempt to define the current importance of geography, energy, and the 
global powers’’ competition for influence over Azerbaijan to determinate how these factors 
affect the independence of Azeri foreign policy. 
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1.4 Research Question, Variables, and Hypothesis 
1.4.1 Research Question 
How do geography, energy, and global powers’ competition for influence over Azerbaijan 
affect the independence of Azerbaijan's foreign policy? 
1.4.2 Variables 
This work analyzes three different variables: geography, energy, and global powers’ 
competition. The first variable refers to Azerbaijan’s landlocked geography.  The 
geographic location of Azerbaijan can affect its foreign policy in the long run. States without 
sea outlets might struggle to keep their economic independence by comparison to states 
with sea outlets. Transit states might take advantage of their geographic location to achieve 
economic and political benefits from landlocked states. Thus, the landlocked states have to 
develop a pragmatic foreign policy, seeking to meet the transit states’ claims and balance 
the power of those transit states.  
The second variable analyzes the influence that the energy resources have in Azeri 
foreign policy. The energy resources have the capability to intensify the political instability 
of any region, as has happened in the South Caucasus. The controversy over the oil and gas 
routes that transport Azeri energy resources to Western markets increased the 
competition among the regional states and global powers. Thus, the evaluation of the 
impact that Azeri natural resources have in Azeri foreign policy is a crucial matter in order 
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to elucidate whether energy resources can increase or decrease the independence of Azeri 
foreign policy.  
The last variable analyzes the competition of global powers—the US and Russia. The 
relationships between these powers and Azerbaijan vary according to their own interests. 
The US seeks to increase its influence over Azerbaijan in economic and military aspects. 
The American participation in the trade of the Azeri energy resources decreases the 
Russian position as an energy supplier of Western states. It also increases Azeri economic 
independence from Russia, providing more influence to the US over the Azeri politics. In 
the Russian case, Moscow would attempt to maintain its status as hegemonic regional 
power over its sphere of influence, the former Soviet Republics. Russia also would oppose 
NATO expansion into the South Caucasus states, using military actions if needed, as 
happened in August 2008 when Russia invaded Georgia. Therefore, by analyzing 
geography, energy, and global powers’ competition variables, this study attempts to 
elucidate the degree of independence of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy.  
1.4.3 Hypothesis 
The hypothesis of this research proposes that the landlocked features of Azerbaijan, 
its energy resources, and the global powers’ competition for influence over the South 
Caucasus region affect Azerbaijan's foreign policy.  
The first factor, Azerbaijan’s landlocked geography, potentially alters Azeri foreign 
policy. Since transit states play a key role for any landlocked state, the latter finds some 
constrictions to develop an independent foreign policy. Three of the four states that 
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surround the Azeri territory can provide an outlet for Azeri natural resources. These states 
are Russia in the north, Iran in the south, and Georgia in the West. Russia and Iran have a 
developed energy industry with oil and gas pipeline networks to transport the Caspian 
energy resources to world markets by carrying or swapping them. However, Baku chose 
Georgia as a transit state for its oil and gas due to political and security factors.  
The energy resource, the second factor, is critical to understanding how Azerbaijan 
has developed its foreign policy after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Azeri authorities 
have sought to strengthen Azeri political and military independence from Russia through 
the exportation of its energy resources to Western markets using new pipelines. Azeri oil 
and gas became a tool to increase Baku’s leverage in the South Caucasus. However, the 
Azeri energy resources increased the Russian and Western states’ interests in the 
exploitation and commercialization of the Azeri oil and gas.  
Finally, the third factor explains the competition between global powers for 
influence over Azerbaijan. Although Azerbaijan gained its independence in 1991, it did not 
materialize entirely in economic, political, and security fields, especially since Russia 
considers the Caucasus region its sphere of influence. The presence of Western powers 
reduces Russian leverage in economic and security fields. The Western states’ involvement 
in the South Caucasus region increases Azeri economic, political, and military 
independence from Russia, and it strengths Western influence over Azerbaijan and the 
other Caspian and Central Asian states. 
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1.5 Methodology  
This work applies geopolitical concepts to analyze the degree of independence of 
Azeri foreign policy based on geography, energy, and competition among global powers. 
This study uses a deductive method of qualitative research to evaluate the hypotheses in 
different chapters. Each chapter follows a longitudinal analysis of qualitative variables, 
using historical data analysis in order to provide a historical framework of the South 
Caucasus region and Azerbaijan.  
The first chapter reviews the most significant academic works in the field in order to 
delineate the political framework of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy. The second chapter 
discusses how the Azeri territorial features, as a landlocked state, have played a key role in 
the development of Azeri foreign policy. The lack of sea outlets has affected Azeri 
international relations with its neighbors, forcing Baku to maintain strong relations with 
the transit states that encircle Azerbaijan. This landlocked feature of Azerbaijan allowed it 
to balance regional and global powers’ interests in the South Caucasus region. The Western 
states’ interests in Azeri energy resources have increased Azeri leverage to deal with non-
Western states such as Russia and Iran. Thus, this chapter explores and discusses the 
geographical advantages and disadvantages of the Azeri location in regard to its foreign 
policy, analyzing the features of Azerbaijan as a landlocked territory. 
Since the world is under a global transformation in terms of extensity, intensity, 
velocity, and impact, the exploitation and commercialization of energy resources became a 
significant source of wealth and conflict. The third chapter discusses the implications of 
Azeri energy, highlighting the importance of alternative oil and gas pipeline routes to 
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transport Azeri oil and gas, reducing its dependency from transit states, especially Russia. 
This chapter also presents how Azerbaijan has used its energy resources as a tool of 
influence in its relationship with Western and non-Western powers. This proved to be a 
pragmatic policy developed by the Azeri government to deal with global powers.  
The fourth chapter analyzes the current competition between global powers, the US 
and Russia, for influence over Azerbaijan due its oil and gas resources. The Azeri 
government has balanced the US and Russia in order to gain more political, economic, and 
security stability to develop its economy. This policy based on a balance of powers also 
allowed Azerbaijan to gain influence in the Caspian and Central Asia regions.  
Finally, the chapter five summarizes the main conclusions of each chapter, 
highlighting the necessity of a pragmatic foreign policy in this region due to geography, 
energy, and competition among global powers. To illustrate how independent Azeri foreign 
policy is, it is necessary to explain how the existing interaction between geopolitics, energy 
trade, and global powers’ competition for influence in Azerbaijan works in order to 
understand of how those factors can affect Azeri foreign policy. 
1.6 Literature Review 
In recent decades, the intensification of economic, political, cultural, and military 
affairs has affected decision-making processes in world politics. The increase of world 
connectivity and interdependence in the global economy18 goes along with the growing of 
global threats, such as terrorism groups, separatist movements, climate change, energy 
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scarcity, and religious fundamentalism. In a semi-anarchic system, every state seeks to 
ensure its national unity and interests through alliances or self-help policies, 19 taking into 
consideration how some geographical features might affect the national security of each 
state. Since states’ security depends on controlling territorial borders, pursuing control of 
resources, and securing trade routes with centers of resources,20 geography is a defining 
factor for understanding how the distribution of power between states affects the foreign 
policy of any state. Geography provides a theoretical framework to understand the physical 
composition of some regions and how political institutions interact in those regions. 
Geography plays a key role in the design of foreign policy despite the determinist 
features assigned by some political scientists. Under the determinist point of view, some 
regions are richer in natural resources than others, and those resources influence the 
distribution of power between states. It means that the course of history and its future are 
based on geographic causes, which cannot be fully changed by human beings. 
Technological advances might help human beings to modify some geographic features of 
specific places, but it would not change the major geological characteristics of any region. 
Although the use of technology seeks to connect distant places, making them more 
accessible for human beings and trade and changing the value of these specific locations, it 
does not mean that technology reduces the importance of geography. 
                                                 
19 Tim Dunne and Brian C. Schmidt, "Realism," in The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to 
International Relations, ed. John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2008), 92-94. 
20 Grygiel defines geography as “a combination of immutable geological facts (such as patterns of lands, seas, 
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The natural scientific approach, followed by Halford Mackinder, claims that 
geography determines the fate of nations with a limited input of human actions.21 
Mackinder highlights the importance of the natural resources of the Eurasian region 
(Eastern Europe, South Caucasus, and Central Asia), claiming that the future world power 
will belong to the state that controls Eurasia. As Grygiel points outs, Mackinder’s analysis 
states that the geographic location of Eurasia is what determines its importance, 
reinforcing the natural scientific argument that geographic reality remains unaltered.  
 However, this theoretical approach changed when geography, as a determinist 
feature of international analysis, lost its position as the explanatory variable in politics, and 
it became one variable among others that influence power. 22 Thus, under the Classic 
Realist’s perspective, power replaced geography as the independent variable in 
international relations, and geography became an irrelevant explanatory variable. This 
affirmation lies in the realist principle that states, as the main political actor in world 
politics, expand when they have power and when no other state is capable of limiting the 
expansion. Therefore, geography is no longer a source of power, because human beings, 
through technological advances, are able to reduce the impact that geography has in 
foreign policy.  
By the early 1960s geography moved from natural science to social science, 
highlighting the ability of people and states to overcome the geographical restrictions 
created by nature. This shift decreased the determinist nature assigned to geography 
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22 Classic Realists came up with the idea that geography is only one of many factors affecting power. Grygiel, 
Great Powers, 8-11. 
22 
regarding the importance of geography in the analysis of foreign affairs. The realist 
perspective also argues that distance, as a geographic feature, is no longer a variable that 
decreases or increases human or state power in international politics, because power 
defines the capacity of each state to face world politics, especially since new technologies 
increased the capacity of states to project power to any remote area without decreasing 
effectiveness.23 
A third perspective about geography’s role in foreign affairs includes defensive and 
offensive realists' perception. Since states do not interact in an abstract world but in a real 
one, geographical distance and location matter. Therefore, political scientists have to 
analyze how geography affects states’ interaction. Policy makers have to include geography 
as a potential variable to evaluate their political, economic, and military calculations in the 
design of a national geo-strategy. It means that geography affects foreign policy in a 
peculiar fashion, especially since distance affects the perception of threat. Indeed, 
geographical distance between states does not necessarily isolate states from possible 
military confrontations with other states that are distant from the zone of conflict. In recent 
decades the increasing demand of energy recourses, for example, has increased the 
possibility of military confrontations in different zones.24 
Mackinder wrote some of the initial works on geopolitics at the beginning of the 
20th century. His theory states that world history is a struggle for the dominance of land 
and sea. He argues that dominance over land is more significant than dominance of the sea, 
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referring to the Eurasian region. The territory that links Europe and Asia, Eurasia, has 
enough natural resources and population to provide hegemonic power to the state that 
controls that region.25 Although Mackinder’s concepts were applied to a wider geographic 
area than the South Caucasus, which he named the Heartland (Eurasia), this research 
employs Mackinder's concepts to analyze the foreign policy of Azerbaijan in the South 
Caucasus region. 
Mackinder’s work on geopolitics, The Geographical Pivot of History, delivered in 
1904, described the British anxiety about its imperial future in the 20th century. He stated 
that “the development and expansion of railway networks had shifted the balance of power 
away from sea faring imperial nations—most obviously Britain—toward nations that were 
better positioned to exert land-based authority over continental interiors . . . whichever 
power controlled the world’s landmasses would henceforth have access to the vast and 
largely untapped resource wealth of the continental interiors.” 26 For Mackinder, Eurasia 
was the geographic area that all the global powers attempted to control due to its strategic 
relevance for trade and security between Western and Asian civilizations. In late 1837, the 
Russian advance in Central Asia represented the first hostile action between these two 
imperial powers. 27  
                                                 
25 Brian W. Blouet, “Halford Mackinder and the Pivotal Heartland,” in Global Geostrategy: Mackinder and the 
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Mackinder depicts three main aspects of the Heartland: control of resources, 
transportation infrastructure, and inaccessibility. 28 Eurasia’s natural resources were 
relevant since the late 1890's, when Western powers became aware of the importance of 
Azeri energy resources, and they discussed the Black Sea-Azerbaijan-Caspian Sea corridor. 
The political and economic influence over Azeri natural resources is still a matter of 
competition between global powers. Coene states that in the case of infrastructure for 
transportation,29 railways played a crucial role for trade during the late 1890's and early 
1900's. Those routes allowed Eurasian countries to develop their agricultural, 
manufacturing, pastoral, and mining industries.30 In late 1800, the first oil companies 
showed their interests in Azeri oil, which emerged as a valuable commodity during that 
time. Since then, states and private companies have sought to improve the infrastructure of 
the Azeri energy industry to exploit and trade its oil and gas. 
According to David Hooson, the South Caucasus increased its importance due to 
existing energy resources, terrorist groups, and ethnic conflicts. These factors have made it 
difficult to forecast the future of Azerbaijan.31  As Mackinder showed one hundred years 
ago, the Azeri energy resources have been a key factor for global powers in the struggle to 
control Central Asia and the Caucasus regions. The oil and gas reserves found in Azerbaijan 
and the other Caspian states highlighted the significance of the region for commerce and 
security. On the other hand, international terrorism has become a new political, economic, 
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 O’hara, Heffernan, and Endfield, “Geographical Pivot,” 97. 
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and military factor for strengthening cooperation among Russia, the US, the EU, Turkey, 
South Caucasus state, and Central Asian countries, renewing the importance of Eurasia.  
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CHAPTER TWO: GEOGRAPHY 
2.1 Geography and Geopolitics in International Relations  
The South Caucasus called “lands in-between,”32 as a corridor between Europe and 
Asia, has connected the Black and Caspian Seas for centuries, showing the cultural link 
between Western and Asian civilizations, the religious encounter between Christianity and 
Islam, and the trade link between the West and East. Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia are 
the three former Soviet republics that belong to the South Caucasus region. After the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan and Georgia attempted to enhance their economic, 
political, and military independence from Russia, and they began a multi-vector foreign 
policy in order to balance power in the region against Russia. In the early 1990s, Western 
states increased their interest in the South Caucasus states, specifically for geographic, 
energy, and security reasons. Armenia became a pro-Russian state, gaining military, 
political, and economic support from Russia while Azerbaijan and Georgia, which have 
faced different ethno-political conflicts, became pro-Western states. 33 
As a landlocked nation, Azerbaijan has attempted to create robust and friendly 
relations with all its neighbors, except with Armenia due to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, 
in order to have alternatives routes to export its energy resources through transit states, 
such as Georgia, Russia, Turkey, and Iran. The pro-Western Azeri foreign policy, however, 
made possible the construction of new pipeline routes, which run from Baku to Tbilisi 
                                                 
32 Thomas De Waal, The Caucasus: An Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 1. 
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(Georgia), then to Ceyhan (Turkey), and finally to Western markets through the 
Mediterranean Sea.34 
Azeri oil and gas resources increase the global and regional power interests in 
Azerbaijan, decreasing Azerbaijan’s landlocked geographic constrictions. Access to Azeri 
energy resources produce four outcomes: 1) it allows Western states to diversify their 
energy suppliers; 2) it increases the American influence over European and South Caucasus 
states; 3) it compels Russia to redesign its energy policy with Azerbaijan; and 4) it 
increases Iranian interests in the commercialization of the Azeri energy resources. It seems 
that Azeri oil and gas are capable bringing regional and global powers to compete for 
influence, and it allows the Azeri government to balance power in the South Caucasus 
region. The four outcomes also imply that military confrontations might be expected in the 
South Caucasus region. 
In the geopolitical field, a number of new studies have investigated how the 
landlocked feature of Azerbaijan affects Azeri foreign policy. 35 As Idan and Shaffer’s 
analysis demonstrates, Azerbaijan follows a multi-directional foreign policy characterized 
by the cooperation with Russia (e.g. keeping a Russian strategic radar station in Qabala) 
and with the US (e.g. taking an active role in NATO’s Partnership for Peace program). 
Azerbaijan is also a member of several strategic-international institutions, 36 showing its 
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awareness of the important role of cooperation with global and regional organizations to 
achieve stability in the South Caucasus. 
 The geographic location of Azerbaijan increases the chances of a military 
confrontation in the South Caucasus region, where global powers are competing for 
influence. In the case of the Western powers, the geographic distance between those states 
and Azerbaijan is broad enough to assume that Western states are unlikely to participate in 
a war in the South Caucasus on a regular basis because Western states have no territory at 
risk. Nevertheless, it is likely that Western states might take part in any military 
confrontation where their energy supplies from Azerbaijan or Caspian states are affected. 
For that reason, global powers would not limit their political, economic, and military 
intervention to their home territory but to other geographical locations where energy 
resources are held. It shows that geographical areas rich in natural resources would not 
remain isolated because the current geographical extension of any state is not limited to its 
home territory but in fact extends beyond to where vital resources are located.  In the Azeri 
case, the geographical features of Azerbaijan affect the balance of power between the US 
and Russia, opening the possibility of future confrontations between Azerbaijan and its 
neighbor states. 
 The dynamics created by the combination of energy resources and landlocked 
geography strengthen the argument that geographical features37 affect the balance of 
power and create the scenery for possible military confrontations where global and 
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regional powers take part in order to defend their national interests, in this case energy 
consumption. 
2.2 Geopolitics in International Relations  
The geographical location of Azerbaijan
38
 imposes serious constraints on the Azeri 
government’s ability to design a predictable foreign policy. The Azeri borders with Russia in the 
North, Iran in the South, Armenia and Georgia in the West, and the Caspian Sea in the East 
elucidate the complex relationships that Azerbaijan has created with its neighbor states. Azeri 
leaders realized that the balance of power between global and regional powers is a pragmatic 
strategy to achieve political, economic, and military stability in the region. Azerbaijan did not 
design an ideological foreign policy as many buffer states did during and after the Second World 
War. Instead, it designed a pragmatic one that took advantage of Azerbaijan’s geography and 
energy resources and of global powers’ competition for influence. 
The rising demand for energy resources in recent decades increased the importance of 
Azeri oil and gas for Western and Non-Western industrialized states. The newly exploited Azeri 
oil and gas fields and the modern routes (the BTC and BTE pipelines) have persuaded global 
powers to take part in the commercialization and exploitation of the Azeri energy resources. In 
the early 20
th
 century, Mackinder claimed that Eurasia39 has the potential to develop the major 
industrial power in the world due to the size of the population and the natural resources located 
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and International Dynamics, ed. Mohiaddin Mesbahi (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1994), 229.  
30 
in Eurasia. He argued that the nation, which controls Eurasia would be able to build an 
incomparable military force to ensure its hegemonic position in the world.40 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US has been redesigning its foreign policy, 
seeking to avoid the ascending of any hegemonic state in Eurasia. The American approach to this 
region has been less confrontational, seeking to spread American influence in former Soviet 
Republics of the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Within the American strategy fitted 
Azerbaijan, whose geographical location and energy resources were crucial for Western 
interests. Since Azerbaijan was not able to reduce the Russian influence as a regional and global 
power in the South Caucasus, the Azeri government persuaded Western powers and investors 
to participate in the Azeri energy business, ensuring profitable gains in the exploitation of 
Azeri oil and gas and their export to Western markets. Western involvement in the Azeri 
energy industry would ensure the transportation of energy to international markets 
through the construction of pipelines, highways, and other communication networks. This 
pro-Western policy increased the political stability, economic development, and military 
security of Azerbaijan in recent decades, regardless of Russian complaints and concerns 
about the Azeri-American relationship. 
Within the geopolitical issues that affect international relations in the South 
Caucasus region, territorial conflicts have altered the development of energy centers and 
pipelines routes in Azerbaijan. The military conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over 
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the Nagorno-Karabakh region41 in the early 1990’s changed the initial Azeri plans to 
develop an oil pipeline that would have run Azeri oil from Azerbaijan through Armenia and 
Turkey. After the conflict, Azeri authorities chose Georgia as a transit state for its oil and gas, 
seeking to ensure the continuous supply of the energy to international markets. This strategic 
change, however, increased the cost of the pipelines. The territorial conflict in Nagorno-
Karabakh remains unsolved, and Armenians fear that Azeri authorities might be prolonging 
the unresolved conflict to rebuild the Azeri military capabilities for future confrontations. 
Some speculate that Azerbaijan intends to begin a military attack on Armenia should Baku 
not succeed in the Nagorno-Karabakh negotiations with Yerevan.42 Armenians and Azeri 
are suspicious of one another, and they have been equipping their military forces to protect 
their national interests.43  
Since geopolitical factors change, states are continuously adapting themselves to the 
new centers of resources, as happened after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In this regard, 
Azerbaijan became a new energy center in a region where Russia was the hegemonic state 
in the trade and production of oil and gas. In the 1990's, Caspian oil and gas gained 
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importance in the world, which created the opportunity for a possible change in the 
balance of power in Eurasia after the Russian withdrawal of the former Soviet republics.  
Once Azerbaijan became a new center of energy resources, the Azeri government 
developed new routes to transport its oil and gas to international markets. 44 The location 
and transportation of Azeri energy became the main reason for Western states’ 
involvement in Azerbaijan and the South Caucasus. The Azeri government developed a 
foreign policy balancing regional and global powers, seeking to keep regional stability, 
economic development, and national security. 
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CHAPTER THREE: ENERGY 
3.1 Energy Background  
Azeri geography is crucial for international energy interests. Azerbaijan supplies oil 
and gas to Western markets through the transit states of Georgia and Turkey. Since 
Azerbaijan is a landlocked state, transit states influence Azeri foreign policy, allowing Baku 
to export its energy resources to international markets.45 While the last chapter talked 
about the landlocked features and their impact on Azeri foreign policy, this chapter 
analyzes how energy affects Azeri interaction in international politics. 
Economic factors based on energy-related issues have strengthened the Azeri 
relationship with its neighbor states and global powers. Georgia and Armenia, in a regional 
perspective, have poor and undeveloped economies, and those states have seen the need to 
transport Azeri natural resources as an economic opportunity to improve their fragile 
economies. Georgia and Armenia, like many other former Soviet Republics, have depended 
on Russia as an energy supplier and policy maker for decades, and the collapse of the Soviet 
Union increased their uncertainty about their economic future. However, when Azerbaijan 
became an independent state, the South Caucasus states realized the benefits they could 
obtain by strengthening their economic ties with Azerbaijan. The Azeri neighbor states, 
including Turkey, negotiated different possible routes with Azeri authorities to transport 
Azeri oil and gas to Western markets. These states knew that they were key players within 
                                                 
45 Idan and Shaffer, “Post-Soviet Landlocked States,” 241. 
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the Azeri energy projects, and it would allow these transit states to gain significant 
economic revenues for the transit fee, improving their economic situations.46 
Since energy is the most prominent resource and the hardest to ensure for 
industrial purposes, global powers have been attempting to diversify energy suppliers to 
meet their economic goals. The importance of oil and gas for industrialized states has 
reached significant levels in the last two decades. In a global perspective, the Western 
European states' energy dependency on Russian and Middle Eastern energy is a clear 
example of the significance of Azeri oil and gas for Western markets. Azerbaijan’s energy 
resources fit within Western economic interests because access to Azeri oil and gas 
decreases the European states’ dependency on Russian energy and increases the US 
influence in the South Caucasus region. It also decreases the Russian hegemonic position as 
an energy supplier for European countries. Western states, for their part, collaborate 
economically and politically with Azerbaijan, promoting democracy, rule of law, human 
rights, conflict resolution campaigns, and free markets. Thus, energy is a major factor in 
maintaining Azeri political, economic, and military stability, while also increasing its 
independence by balancing regional and global powers in the South Caucasus region. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan became an energy exporter state, 
making oil and natural gas exploitation its main source of income. Through the 
participation of international oil companies, Azerbaijan developed different energy 
projects to increase its oil and gas exploitation capacity. Azeri oil and gas runs through 
modern pipeline networks, which take the Azeri energy from its offshore and gas fields in 
                                                 
46 Zeyno Baran and Robert A. Smith, “The Energy Dimension in American Policy towards the Black Sea 
Region,” Southern European and Black Sea Studies 7 (2007): 265-74. 
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the Caspian Sea and Azeri territory, respectively. By 2009, Azerbaijan was producing 1.3 
percent of the oil47 in the world,48 with a reserves-to-production ratio of 18.6 years.49 It 
also produced 0.5 percent of the natural gas of the world, possessing reserves for up to 88.8 
years. 50 
The Azeri Ministry of Industry and Energy is the government institution that 
supervises the exploitation and administration of Azeri natural resources. To meet the 
industrial and commercial demands of oil and gas, the Azeri government created the State 
Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR), which is responsible for the production of 
Azeri oil and gas. SOCAR's participation in the production of energy includes other 
industrial activities related to the operation of refineries, running national pipeline 
systems, and the managing of the oil and gas imports and exports. 
The largest Azeri hydrocarbon resource is the Chirag Guneshli (ACG) oil field, 
located 100 km east of Baku, covering 432 square km.  British Petroleum (BP) operates this 
oil field, which produced almost 80 percent of the total Azeri oil output in 2010.51 The Shah 
Deniz field, on the other hand, is an offshore natural gas field located in the southern part of 
                                                 
47  This production includes crude oil, shale oil, oil sands, and NGLs (the liquid content of natural gas where 
this is recovered separately). Excludes liquid fuels from other sources such as biomass and coal derivatives. 
48 This consumption includes inland demand plus international aviation and marine bunkers and refinery fuel 
and loss. Consumption of fuel ethanol and biodiesel is also included. 
49 Reserves-to-production (R/P) ratio – If the reserves remaining at the end of any year are divided by the 
production in that year, the result is the length of time that those remaining reserves would last if production 
were to continue at that rate. 
50 All these statistics were taken from "BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2010," accessed on 
February 20,2012, 
http://www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle800.do?categoryId=9037128&contentId=7068555 
51 "Azerbaijan: Country Analysis Brief," US Energy Information Administration, accessed February 20, 2012, 
http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=AJ&trk=p1. 
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the Azeri Caspian Sea zone. It is the major Azeri natural gas field, and it is under BP 
administration and operation. This field is 64 km southeast of Baku.52  
Although SOCAR’s participation in the Azeri energy field is significant, Figure 1 and 
Figure 2 show that the Azeri state company produces less than 20 percent of Azerbaijan’s 
national resources while the international consortium produces the remaining 80 
percent.53 These figures show that international oil companies are the leading exploiters of 
Azeri energy resources, implying that foreign interests are part of Azeri energy 
development. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Oil production (annual in 1000 t)54 
 
                                                 
52 "Azerbaijan: Country Analysis Brief," US Energy Information Administration, accessed February 20, 2012, 
http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=AJ&trk=p1. 
53 British Petroleum operates the AIOC consortium. "Azerbaijan: Country Analysis Brief," US Energy 
Information Administration, accessed February 20, 2012, http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-
data.cfm?fips=AJ&trk=p1. 
54 Source: “Economics & Statistics, Oil Production” State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic, accessed 
June 25 2012, http://new.socar.az/socar/en/economics-and-statistics/economics-and-statistics/oil-
production. 
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Figure 2: Gas production (annual in millions m3)55 
 
These figures show that the Azeri government wants to consolidate its energy 
industry in order to develop its economy and to ensure its security. The Azeri government 
designed pro-Western routes to export its oil and gas to international markets to increase 
its economic and energy independence from Russia.56 The Azeri authorities distanced 
themselves from Moscow and became closer to the Western states, since some American 
oil companies invested heavily in the Azeri oil industry. Washington authorities also got 
involved in the Azeri energy business when they participated in the negotiations and 
design of different pipeline projects to transport the Azeri oil and gas to international 
markets, bypassing Russian territory, as is the case of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil 
pipeline.57 Baku has developed a multi-vector foreign policy using multi-pipeline routes58 
                                                 
55 Source: “Economics & Statistics, Gas Production” State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic, accessed 
June 25 2012, http://new.socar.az/socar/en/economics-and-statistics/economics-and-statistics/gas-
production.  
56 Eldar Ismailov and Vladimer Papava, “A New Concept for the Caucasus,” Southern European and Black Sea 
Studies 8 (2008), 283-98. 
57 Alexei Bogaturov, “The Time of Central Asia,” International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, 
Diplomacy & International Relations 51 (2005): 74-84. 
58 Idan and Shaffer, “Post-Soviet Landlocked States,” 241-68.  
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to export its oil and gas to international markets, balancing regional and global powers. The 
Azeri government applied a pragmatic foreign policy, which did not follow ideological and 
cultural tendencies.59 As Idan and Shaffer explain, Azerbaijan’s landlocked geography 
resulted in a foreign policy that was multidirectional, that relied on multiple pipelines for 
oil export, that implemented distinctive policies toward its transit states, and that treated 
transportation as a major foreign policy issue.60 
 This multi-vector foreign policy was a response to the Azeri necessity of expanding 
its energy export infrastructure. The Azeri foreign minister Elmar Mammadyarov has 
stated that Baku has attempted to diversify its energy export capabilities. This claim 
follows the ongoing Azeri energy export policy, which allows Baku to export its energy 
resources from Baku to Georgia (Port of Supsa), to Russia (Novorossiyk), and to Iran (using 
swaps).61 In addition to these energy outlets, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which 
became operational in 2005, is the most significant route for transporting Azeri oil to 
international markets. Thus, this multi-vector policy and multiple pipeline routes have 
been successful for Azerbaijan because they increased the nation’s economic independence 
and security in the South Caucasus regions by balancing the economic and political 
interests of the regional and global powers. 
                                                 
59 Houman A. Sadri, Global Security Watch: The Caucasus States (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2010), 53-55. 
60 Idan and Shaffer, “Post-Soviet Landlocked States,” 254-55. 
61 Idan and Shaffer, “Post-Soviet Landlocked States,” 258. 
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3.2 Oil and Natural Gas Pipelines  
Azerbaijan has a modern pipeline network to export its energy resources. The Azeri 
oil infrastructure includes three different pipelines: the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline 
(BTC), the Baku-Novorossiyk pipeline (BN), and the Baku-Supsa pipeline (BS), as Figure 3 
shows. Azeri natural gas on the other hand, runs through three pipelines: the Baku-Tbilisi-
Erzurum or the South Caucasus pipeline (SCP), the Gazi-Magomed-Mozdok pipeline (GMM), 
and the Baku-Astara pipeline (BA). 
 
 
Figure 3: Oil and gas pipelines from Azerbaijan 
3.2.1 Oil Pipelines 
The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, sponsored by the US government, provides 
Azerbaijan significant economic and political independence from Russia because it avoids 
Russian territory, taking the Azeri oil from Baku to Tbilisi, and then to the Ceyhan port in 
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the Mediterranean Sea. 62 As a consequence of the Azeri-Turkish energy relationship, both 
countries have strengthened their commercial ties. These nations have also strengthened 
their relationship in other areas, including military support when Turkey supported 
Azerbaijan in the Azeri-Armenian conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. 63 This relationship has 
also increased Baku’s independence from Russia by increasing the Azeri leverage in energy. 
The BTC is a 1,768 km pipeline that runs through Azerbaijan (443 km), Georgia (249 
km) and Turkey (1,076 km). It starts in the Sangachal terminal, located offshore in 
southern Azerbaijan in the Caspian Sea, and it finishes in the Ceyhan terminal at the 
Turkish coast of the Mediterranean Sea. The British company BP operates this pipeline, 
which started exporting oil with a capacity of 1.2 million bbl/d by July 2006. The BTC 
exports about 80 percent of Azeri oil. Additionally, the BTC also transports Kazakh oil to 
Western markets. Kazakh oil travels through the Caspian Sea in tankers to reach the Azeri 
oil terminal in Sangachal near Baku, and then it runs through the BTC to Western 
markets.64 
The Baku-Novorossiysk (BN) pipeline runs from the Azeri Sangachal terminal in the 
Caspian Sea to the Russian port Novorossiysk in the Black Sea. At 1336 km in length, it is 
the second longest Azeri oil pipeline. The state oil company SOCAR operates this pipeline in 
                                                 
62 During Bill Clinton’s presidency, the US firmly opposed an alternative pipeline to transport Azeri oil, 
especially if it had to go through Iranian territory. Marcus Menzel, Doomed to Cooperate?: American Foreign 
Policy in the Caspian Region (Frankfurt Main: Peter Lang GmbH, 2003), 99-101. 
63 Turkish officials have stated that “[Turkish] relations with Azerbaijan constitute the most important 
strategic axis not only in the Caucasus but also in . . . [Ankara’s] entire foreign policy . . .” See: Saban Kardas, 
“Turkish-Azerbaijan Energy Cooperation and Nabucco: Testing the Limits of the New Turkish Foreign Policy 
Rhetoric,” Turkish Studies 12 (2011): 55-77. Turkey has provided military equipment and training for the 
Azeri army. See: Emre Iseri and Oguz Dilek, “The Limitations of Turkey’s New Foreign Policy Activism in the 
Caucasian Regional Security Complexity,” Turkish Studies 12 (2011): 48. 
64 "Azerbaijan: Country Analysis Brief," US Energy Information Administration, accessed February 20, 2012, 
http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=AJ&trk=p1. 
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the section that runs over Azerbaijan while Transneft operates the Russian section. Baku-
Novorossiysk has a capacity of 100,000 bbl/d.65 
Finally, the Baku-Supsa (BS), which runs for 837 km, is the shortest Azeri oil 
pipeline, and it runs from the Azeri Capital of Baku to the Georgian port Supsa in the Black 
Sea. BP operates this pipeline on behalf of the AOIC members. The Baku-Supsa pipeline has 
an estimated capacity of 145,000 bbl/d.66  
3.2.2 Natural Gas Pipelines 
The South Caucasus pipeline (SCP) or Baku-Tbilisi- Erzurum pipeline is a gas pipeline 
which transports natural gas from the Azeri Shah Deniz gas field in the Caspian Sea to 
Georgia. Then it goes to its final destination in the Turkish city of Erzurum. This pipeline is 
690 km long and runs parallel to the BTC oil pipeline. BP operates this gas pipeline and it 
began exporting gas in 2007.67 The construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline was 
intended to supply natural gas to Turkey and Georgia exclusively, but there have been 
some recent speculations about Azeri government interests in supplying gas to Western 
markets through Turkey-Greece and Italy-Greece pipelines. However, BP closed the 
pipeline for several days in August 2008 when Russia invaded the southern Georgian 
region of South Ossetia. After the Russian-Georgian war ended, BP reopened the BTE.  
                                                 
65 "Azerbaijan: Country Analysis Brief," US Energy Information Administration, accessed February 20, 2012, 
http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=AJ&trk=p1. 
66 "Azerbaijan: Country Analysis Brief," US Energy Information Administration, accessed February 20, 2012, 
http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=AJ&trk=p1. 
67 "Azerbaijan: Country Analysis Brief," US Energy Information Administration, accessed February 20, 2012, 
http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=AJ&trk=p1. 
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The Gazi-Magomed-Mozdok (GMM) pipeline runs from Azerbaijan to Russia, and 
extends 241 km. This pipeline is part of a Russian and Azeri pipeline project that runs from 
the Russian regions of Mozdok in North Ossetia, Chechnya, and Dagestan to the Azeri 
capital of Baku. This pipeline became inactive when Azerbaijan became a natural gas 
supplier. However, in 2008, the Russian energy company Gazprom decided to diversify its 
imports of natural gas from the Azeri Shah Deniz gas field. In June 2009, the Russian 
president Dmitry Medvedev and the Chairman of Gazprom, Alexey Miller, met with Illham 
Aliyev, the president of Azerbaijan, in Baku to discuss energy projects between Gazprom 
and SOCAR, including the recent Russian purchase of Azeri natural gas. The Russian and 
Azeri authorities agreed to sign energy contracts over the existing pipeline infrastructure 
and Azerbaijan would sell 500 million cubic meters annually to Russia.68 The Gazi-
Magomed-Mozdok (GMM) pipeline, operated by SOCAR, began exporting natural gas to 
Russia in 2010.69  
The Baku-Astara (BA) pipeline originally built in 1965 as part of an energy 
agreement made between Iran and the Soviet Union. Iran provided natural gas to the South 
Caucasus states through this pipeline until the Iranian revolution cut off the energy 
agreement. In 2006 Azerbaijan and Iran agreed to a swap where Azerbaijan provides 
natural gas to northern Iranian through the Baku-Astara pipeline, and Iran supplies gas to 
the Azeri enclave of Nakhchivan. Iran had to build a new gas pipeline with an extension of 
                                                 
68 “Gazprom and SOCAR Sign Agreement on Azerbaijani Gas Purchase and Sale Terms,” Gazprom, accessed 
March 12, 2012, http://www.gazprom.com/press/news/2009/june/article66713/.  
69 "Azerbaijan: Country Analysis Brief," US Energy Information Administration, accessed February 20, 2012, 
http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=AJ&trk=p1. 
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48 km to be able to supply natural gas to the Azeri enclave, and Azerbaijan is paying a 15 
percent commission to Iran for transit fees.70  
3.3 Oil and Natural Gas Imports and Exports71  
Table 1 and Figure 4 illustrate Azerbaijan’s crude oil exports and their main destinations—
Italy, France, Israel and the US—during the period from 2005 to 2010. Azerbaijan exported 
crude oil for a value of $44,171 million in 2008, which was the highest profit received in 
those five years. 
 
Figure 4: Exports of petroleum crude oil—code 270972 
 
 
                                                 
70 "Azerbaijan: Country Analysis Brief," US Energy Information Administration, accessed February 20, 2012, 
http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=AJ&trk=p1. 
71 The data regarding imports and exports were extracted from the UN Trade Website. To obtain this 
information, we selected the data reported by Azerbaijan between the years 2005 and 2010, for codes 2709, 
2710, and 2711. http://unstats.un.org/unsd/databases.htm 
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 This chart includes only the main energy partners. 
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Table 1: Exports for petroleum crude oil—code 2709 
Exports 
Code 2709 
2005 
(MM$) 
2006 
(MM$) 
2007 
(MM$) 
2008 
(MM$) 
2009 
(MM$) 
2010 
(MM$) 
Italy $1,218 $2,443 $642 $19,011 $3,646 $6,904 
France $331 $334 $153 $2,281 $1,229 $1,839 
Israel $132 $574 $278 $3,418 $1,215 $1,745 
Turkey $63 $110 $839 $274 $0 $0 
Indonesia $0 $0 $390 $1,411 $661 $782 
USA $0 $75 $211 $5,972 $1,735 $1,703 
Russian Federation $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
World $2,219 $3,848 $3,214 $44,171 $11,990 $18,490 
These countries represent 79% 92% 78% 73% 71% 70% 
 
The crude oil imported to Azerbaijan, by comparison, was not as significant as 
Azerbaijan’s crude oil exports during the same period, as Table 2 and Figure 5 illustrate. 
The main Azeri providers of crude oil were the United Kingdom and Austria during the 
period between 2005 and 2010. However, these energy suppliers exported petroleum to 
Azerbaijan in the relatively insignificant amount of $112,000. From 2006 to 2007, 
Azerbaijan did not report any importation of crude oil. 
 
Figure 5: Imports of petroleum crude oil—code 270973 
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 This chart includes only the main energy partners. 
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Table 2: Imports of petroleum crude oil—code 2709 
 Imports 
Code 2709 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
United Kingdom $127       $11 $795 
Austria       $111679     
U.S.       $522     
Netherlands       $339     
Turkey       $262     
France         $1728   
World $127 0 0 $112802 $1739 $795 
These countries represent 100% 
  
100% 100% 100% 
 
 During the period between 2005 and 2010, Azerbaijan exported only petroleum to 
five main destinations: Georgia, Turkey, Italy, Iran, and Malta.  They did not import crude 
oil during this period. Table 3 and Figure 6 illustrate the different export incomes that 
Azerbaijan received during those five years, gaining the highest amount of income in 2008, 
when Azerbaijan received $2.054 billion.  
 
Figure 6: Export of petroleum oils except crude—code 271074 
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 This chart includes only the main energy partners. 
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Table 3: Export of petroleum oils except crude—code 271075 
Exports 
Code2710 
2005 
(MM$) 
2006 
(MM$) 
2007 
(MM$) 
2008 
(MM$) 
2009 
(MM$) 
2010 
(MM$) 
Georgia $178 $229 $161 $341 $224 $275 
Turkey $139 $191 $133 $228 $61 $101 
Iran $76 $208 $340 $128 $20 $3 
Italy $71 $388 $284 $203 $129 $132 
Greece $46 $84 $115 $83 $34 $43 
Malta $42 $21 $118 $111 $83 $116 
USA $26 $19 $58 $18 $9 $1 
Russian Fed. $5 $2 $0 $0 $157 $12 
World $1,090 $1,505 $1,669 $2,054 $1,483 $1,284 
These countries 
Represent 53% 76% 72% 54% 48% 53% 
 
 All petroleum oil except crude imported by Azerbaijan was not as prominent as the 
Azeri's exportation of the same commodity during the same period of time. Turkmenistan, 
Belgium, Turkey, and Russia are the most significant and constant providers for the period 
between 2005 and 2010, as Table 4 and Figure 7 illustrate. The highest level of importation 
was in 2005, which reached $162 million. 
  
                                                 
75 Petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous minerals, other than crude; preparations not elsewhere 
specified or included, containing by weight 70% or more of petroleum oils or of oils obtained from 
bituminous minerals, these oils being the basic con [HS2007 code 2710] 
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Figure 7: Import of petroleum oils except crude—code 271076  
 
Table 4: Import of petroleum oils except crude—code 2710 
Imports 
Code 2710 
2005 
(MM$) 
2006 
(MM$) 
2007 
(MM$) 
2008 
(MM$) 
2009 
(MM$) 
2010 
(MM$) 
Turkmenistan $140 $58 $21 $31 $13 $0 
Russian 
Federation $10 $5 $7 $14 $8 $9 
Belgium $5 $12 $13 $20 $9 $15 
Turkey $2 $3 $5 $7 $9 $10 
United Kingdom $1 $2 $7 $7 $4 $6 
USA $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $2 
Italy $0 $0 $3 $4 $4 $7 
World $162 $86 $64 $97 $54 $66 
These countries 
Represent 98% 93% 88% 87% 87% 77% 
 
 Between 2005 and 2010, Azerbaijan had three main destinations for its natural gas, 
Georgia, Bulgaria, and Albania, as Table 5 and Figure 8 illustrate. However, Russia became 
the major destination of the Azeri natural gas in 2010, buying almost $304 million worth of 
Azeri gas. 
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 This chart includes only the main energy partners. 
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Figure 8: Export of natural gas in gaseous state—code 271177 
 
Table 5: Export of natural gas in gaseous state—code 2711 
Exports 
Code 2711 
2005 
(MM$) 
2006 
(MM$) 
2007 
(MM$) 
2008 
(MM$) 
2009  
(MM$) 
2010  
(MM$) 
Georgia $2.5 $4.4 $19.9 $66.8 $125.8 $74.6 
Bulgaria $0.1 $2.8 $3.4 $8.7 $3.3 $5.7 
Albania $0.0 $0.6 $2.9 $8.3 $2.7 $6.8 
Russian Federation $0.1 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $188.5 
USA $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 
World $3.4 $9.9 $26.3 $92.6 $131.8 $303.9 
These countries 
represent 80% 80% 99% 90% 100% 91% 
 
 The amount of natural gas imported by Azerbaijan between 2007 and 2010 was not 
as great as the Azeri's exportation of natural gas. The main Azeri suppliers of natural gas 
during the years 2005 and 2006 were Turkmenistan, Russia, and Kazakhstan, as Table 6 
and Figure 9 illustrate. The peak of importation was in 2006, which reached $465 million. 
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 This chart includes only the main energy partners. 
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Figure 9: Import of natural gas in gaseous state—code 271178 
 
Table 6: Import of natural gas in gaseous state—code 2711 
Import 
Code 2711 
2005 
(MM$) 
2006  
(MM$) 
2007  
(MM$) 
2008 
(MM$) 
2009 
(MM$) 
2010  
(MM$) 
Turkmenistan $96.58 $31.10 $0.00 $0.03 $0.15 $0.00 
Kazakhstan $64.38 $54.03 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
Russian 
Federation $25.43 $360.60 $51.71 $0.01 $0.00 $0.00 
United Arab 
Emirates $0.04 $0.16 $0.09 $0.09 $0.20 $0.38 
United Kingdom $0.03 $0.08 $0.15 $0.06 $0.01 $0.03 
Turkey $0.02 $0.00 $0.02 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
USA $0.01 $0.01 $0.09 $0.01 $0.00 $0.00 
World $277.30 $465.38 $52.09 $0.20 $0.38 $0.42 
These Countries 
represent 67% 96% 100% 98% 96% 98% 
 
 In brief, this chapter portrays Azerbaijan as a producer and exporter of oil and 
natural gas. The tables and figures presented show that the major Azeri energy partners 
are European states, Turkey, Georgia, and Russia. The role of Western states in the Azeri 
energy resources is significant due to the influence exerted by their investments in Azeri 
energy. BP, for instance, controls the principal Azeri reserves of oil and natural gas as well 
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as the pipeline networks that transport the oil and gas that is sold to international markets.  
The information depicted in the tables and figures also shows that Azerbaijan changed its 
status from an importer of energy resources to an exporter of energy resources between 
2005 and 2007, when the construction of major international projects, such as pipelines, 
refineries, and exploration platforms ended. The Azeri pipelines that run through Georgia, 
Turkey, Iran, and Russia carry Azeri oil and natural gas to international markets. Therefore, 
the Azeri government has to maintain a good relationship with all its major economic 
investors, including the US, the UK, and Russia.  Azerbaijan must also maintain a good 
relationship with transit states, including Russia, Georgia, Turkey, and Iran, thus balancing 
the power among regional and global powers in order to achieve stability and economic 
prosperity. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: COMPETITION AMONG GLOBAL POWERS 
Azerbaijan, as a landlocked country, needs economic and security partners to 
strengthen its independence from Russia and to balance global powers’ influence in the 
Caucasus. The global and regional powers compete for influence in the South Caucasus 
region, organizing themselves into pro-Western and non-pro-Western states. The first 
group is led by the US and includes the EU and Turkey, while the second group is headed by 
Russia includes Iran and Armenia.79  
The American presence in the South Caucasus attempts to gain influence by 
decreasing Russian power in the region. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the new 
independent states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia attempted to strengthen their 
economic and military independence from Russia. The US became the principal Western 
country supporting the South Caucasus states. The exploitation and commercialization of 
Azeri energy resources in the early 1990’s became the most important reason for the 
American immersion in the region. From the non-pro-Western side, Russia has been the 
principal oil supplier for Europe, which has increased Moscow’s leverage over Western 
states. The participation of Western states and oil companies in the trade of Azeri oil and 
gas has represented a threat for Russia’s hegemonic position as a supplier of oil and gas to 
Western markets.  
                                                 
79 Ismailov Papava, “A New Concept,” 283-98. 
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Therefore, this chapter will analyze the global powers’ competition for influence 
over Azerbaijan in isolation from geographic and energy factors that affect the Azeri 
foreign policy in the interaction among Azerbaijan, the US, and Russia. 
4.1 The Azerbaijan-Russia Relationship 
4.1.1 Background 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia debated the meaning of the Russian 
identity at local, regional, and global levels.80 Although Russian's elite knew Russian power 
had decreased by the end of the 1990’s, Russian leaders realized that the former Soviet 
Union was still important due to Russia’s location, energy resources, and military 
capabilities. Thus, Russia has used bilateral and multilateral relations to preserve its 
hegemonic power in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, where Russian power remains 
largely unchallenged.  
 As Breslauer claims, Russian foreign policy has developed two cyclical phases 
between the last years of the Cold War and the early years of the 21st Century. These 
transitional phases are called transformation and consolidation. When Vladimir Putin took 
power in Russia, the major challenge that Moscow faced was to rebuild its image as a 
superpower, seeking to strengthen its territorial integrity and economic development. 
Putin's administration sought to develop a responsible and predictable foreign 
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policy,81ensuring that Russia was no longer seen as a Western enemy but as an equal 
partner.82 Russian leaders know that Russia’s status as a global power depended in part on 
Moscow’s capability to deal with new local movements and secessionists groups in the 
Caucasus region. The Chechnya and Georgia wars, in 1994 and 2008 respectively, were 
examples of the new Russian reality, where territorial conflicts within Russia and along its 
borders became a serious matter for Moscow because they affect the Russian status as a 
superpower. 
Under these circumstances, Vladimir Putin decided to restore Russian power and 
authority in domestic and international affairs. Putin did not share Gorbachev's and 
Yeltsin’s beliefs about Russian weakness. Gorbachev and Yeltsin shared a pessimistic 
perspective about how Russia was perceived in the world, especially after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union when Russia lost its status as a global power. This perspective depicted 
the Soviet Union as an economically and politically weak state, asking for the West's 
acceptance. 83 Putin believed that Moscow had to take advantage of its economic and 
military resources. In the economic field, Moscow authorities, led by Putin, decided to 
improve the commercialization and production of Russian oil and gas to export these 
energy resources to Europe, seeking to increase Russian leverage over the European states, 
especially since Russia was the major energy supplier for Europe. During Putin’s first 
presidential term, the Russian economy had an average growth of seven percent due to the 
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constant growth of the oil and gas prices and the liberal polices implemented by Putin.  In 
addition, Russia reinforced its process of political consolidation as a great power. 
In the military field, Russia holds a significant variety and quantity of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction (WMD), which are rivaled only by the US. The Russian military capacity 
and technology are recognized around the world, and Russian leaders have used other 
states’ awareness of those weapons and technology to increase its leverage in world affairs. 
Russian military and economic assets can easily persuade other states to avoid 
confrontation with Russia. Moscow also announced to the former Soviet republics that 
Russia would defend its regional and global interests using force if that is needed, as it did 
during the Russia-Georgia War in 2008. This war proved that Russia was committed to 
being recognized as a powerful leader in international affairs, and it showed that the 
Western involvement in the South Caucasus was not strong enough to decrease Russian 
leverage in the region.84 These aggressive actions were part of the pragmatic foreign policy 
developed by Putin to reestablish Russia as a great power. 
Within Russia’s global goals, its geographical location allows it to be in permanent 
connection with the most influential regions, including Europe, the Middle East, Central 
Asia, and the Asia-Pacific markets. 85 Russia’s location encouraged Moscow to create a 
multi-vector86 and pragmatic policy to consolidate its status as a great power. Thus, Russia 
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designed a complex and broad foreign policy to balance the US, the EU, and China 87 in a 
global perspective, and the South Caucasus and Central Asia88 in a regional perspective. 89 
The disagreements among regional and global powers have become a common issue in 
recent decades, and for that reason Russian foreign policy cannot be a one-vector policy, 
choosing only one region  because there are several vectors (regions and states),90 that are 
highly dynamic. 
Regional policy became a crucial field for Russian foreign policy in order to achieve 
international recognition and political, economic, and military stability. The Caucasus and 
Central Asia obtained significance in a global perspective not only by their strategic 
proximity to rogue states, such as Iran and Afghanistan, but also due to their natural 
resources, which can be exported to Western markets. Another strategic region for Russian 
interests is East Asia, especially China and India, where Moscow had dedicated significant 
attention through diplomatic channels to strengthen the multi-vector foreign policy that 
Putin’s government has pursued since he took power. 
Russian economic improvement, its military capability, its direct involvement in 
international organizations, its cultural and religious links with the former Soviet republics, 
its energy interests, and its geographic location, are some of the major features that 
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influence the design of the Russian foreign policy regarding the South Caucasus region. 
Moscow manipulated those factors in its economic, political, and military interests during 
the Soviet era, and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it is still seeking to keep that 
leverage over the South Caucasus region. The geographical condition of Azerbaijan, as a 
landlocked state, allows Russia to increase its power over Azeri oil and gas resources. 
The following sections will discuss the geographic and energy factors that affect the 
Russian-Azeri relationship and the need for a cooperative policy between Russia and 
Azerbaijan in order to ensure an independent Azeri foreign policy. 
4.1.2 Territorial factors in the Relationship between Russia and Azerbaijan 
Russians and people of the Caucasus have lived together for centuries, and that 
created a constant social, economic, political, and cultural interaction among the different 
ethnic groups who inhabit the Caucasus region. This constant communication has created 
the conditions for collaboration based on singular interests. The first years after the 
Caucasus states gained their independence from Russia in the early 1990's were crucial to 
establish open bilateral and multilateral ties with Russia. By June 1996, Russian leaders 
and the main leaders of the Caucasus region signed the “Declaration for International 
Concord, Peace, and Economic and Cultural Cooperation in the Caucasus” in Kislovodsk, 
Russia. This declaration of cooperation in a federative fashion was the most significant 
attempt to keep Caucasus states as a unique community of nations. 91 
                                                 
91 Stanislay Cherniavskii, “Russian Diplomacy in Transcaucasia,” Russian Politics and Law 39 (2001): 6. 
57 
Since Russia considered the South Caucasus as part of its sphere of influence, 
Moscow sought to consolidate the political and military stability of the region by 
strengthening ties with Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. Russian-Caucasus relationships 
did not improve significantly after the collapse of the Soviet Union except for in the case of 
Armenia. Azerbaijan and Georgia sought to strength their economic, political, and military 
independence from Russia by developing a pro-Western foreign policy, which increased 
Russian concerns about the EU and NATO expansion into the Russian sphere of influence. 
Once Russia realized that Western states were establishing security ties with Georgia and 
Azerbaijan, Moscow decided to intensify its political ties with former Soviet republics 
through the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), seeking to decrease Western 
military presence in the South Caucasus region. 92 
During Imperial and Soviet times, the South Caucasus was a buffer zone that 
protected Russia from the outside world, and the collapse of the Soviet Union did not 
change this characteristic. Russia increased its concerns when Azerbaijan designed oil and 
gas pipelines that would take Azeri energy resources to Western markets without passing 
through Russian territory. This Azeri measure would decrease the Russian hegemonic 
position as an oil supplier for Europe, and it also increased the Azeri economic and political 
independence from Russia, especially since the BTC pipeline had economic and political 
support from Western states, led by the US. 93 
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In the case of the Russian-Azeri relationships, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict played 
a crucial role in how both countries built their political and military ties. The Azeri-
Armenian conflict goes back to 1921 when Soviet authorities rejected the Armenian claim 
over the unification of the Nagorno-Karabakh region with Armenia. The Soviet government 
decided to keep that region within Azerbaijan, but that decision did not persuade 
Armenians to give up in their interest in annexing the Nagorno-Karabakh region to the 
main Armenian territory. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Nagorno-Karabakh claimed 
its independence from Azerbaijan and Armenia recognized it, creating a subsequent 
military confrontation between Armenia and Azerbaijan. By February 1992, Armenian 
troops had taken over Khojaly territory, an Azeri enclave in Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan 
claimed that Armenian forces massacred more than 1,000 civilians during this military 
occupation, which had the Russian army’s support. 94 The Russian approach to this conflict 
intensified the Azeri confrontation with Moscow, and it also divided the regional powers in 
the South Caucasus. Turkey directly supported Azerbaijan, closing its borders and imposing 
economic sanctions against Armenia. Iran, on the other hand, took diplomatic measures to 
mediate in the Azeri-Armenian conflict. Russia, in the meantime, dissolved the military 
regiment that it had in the battlefield and ordered its troops to withdraw from the 
Nagorno-Karabakh region. 
During mid-May 1992, Armenia already controlled the whole region of Nagorno-
Karabakh, and by 1993, the Armenian army took almost the twenty percent of Azerbaijan’s 
territory, including the cities of Kebajar, Agdam, Fizuli, Jabrayil, Gubadly, and Zangilan. 
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International organizations began working on resolving the conflict in 1993. The 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)95 demanded an immediate 
ceasefire and the Armenian withdrawal from Azeri territory. The Azeri and Armenian 
claims regarding Nagorno-Karabakh conflict have two different roots. While the Azeri 
government claims territorial integrity, Armenian authorities ask for the conservation of 
their historical heritage. 
By the end of 1999, Russia encouraged Azerbaijan and Armenia to begin with 
bilateral negotiations under the framework of the Minsk Group (MG) in order to work 
together to solve the military conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. In 2000, Russia, in its role as 
co-chair of MG, proposed the creation of a special commission of experts to evaluate the 
conditions for the inhabitants of the Nagorno-Karabakh, proposing the creation of a peace 
mission. Russia worked directly with Robert Kocharian and Heidar Aliyev, the presidents of 
Armenia and Azerbaijan respectively, showing Moscow’s interest in strengthening political 
ties with its new independent neighbors. In mid-August 2000, Korichan and Aliyev met in 
Yalta under Russia’s mediation, and both presidents confirmed their intentions to continue 
the dialogue to solve the territorial confrontation. 96 As of June 2012, Armenia and 
Azerbaijan are still in negotiations for the final resolution to the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict. 
The geographic location of Russia provides Moscow with significant power to 
influence Azerbaijan, which is a landlocked territory with significant energy resources to 
export to international markets. However, the Azeri geographical location limits its 
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possibilities to become a major oil and gas exporter, and for that reason Azerbaijan has had 
to strengthen its ties with Russia, since Moscow had developed an integrated pipeline 
system to transport Caspian oil and gas to international markets. The construction of the 
pipeline shows the Russian commitment to extend its influence over Azerbaijan and the 
South Caucasus through cooperative policies and soft power, or by coercive means and 
hard power. The Russia-Georgia War in 2008 was an example for the latter. 
4.1.3 Energy factors in the Relationship between Russia and Azerbaijan 
The Russian-Azeri relationship in regard to oil began in 1920 when Bolsheviks 
captured Baku, but it acquired geopolitical significance during the Second World War when 
Nazi Germany designed a military offensive against the South Caucasus, seeking to take the 
Baku oilfields, which represented 90 percent of Soviet fuel as of March 1942.97  
Russia and Azerbaijan maintained bilateral relations after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union in 1991. Those relations, however, based on military, economic, political, and 
cultural cooperation did not reach a significant level due to the preexisting mistrust 
between both countries. Some scholars explain that the strategic partnership between 
Russia and Armenia,98 the latter considered the principal enemy of Azerbaijan, increased 
the Azeri mistrust of Russia, especially after Armenia seized the Azeri region of Nagorno-
Karabakh in 1992. It meant that Russia attempted to renew its influence over the South 
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Caucasus region, taking advantages of the territorial and ethnic conflicts in Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan. 
Russian foreign policy in the South Caucasus attempted to prevent the growth of 
Western influence in the region, centralizing the transportation of Azeri oil and gas through 
Russian territory.99 However, after Western states and oil companies began working with 
Azeri and Georgian authorities, Russian leaders changed their approach to Azerbaijan and 
Georgia, seeking to increase Moscow’s participation in the exploitation and 
commercialization of the Azeri energy resources. 
To meet these goals, Russia developed a multilateral and bilateral policy where 
supranational organizations, such as CIS, led by Moscow, played a key role in regional 
affairs between the former Soviet republics and Russia. This multi-vector policy, however, 
did not succeed in strengthening Russian-Azeri relations because Baku developed a 
pragmatic foreign policy balancing Western powers against Russia. Azerbaijan was able to 
reduce the Russian leverage due its oil and gas, but that was not the case for Armenia, 
which has substantially depended on Russia due to Armenian's lack of energy resources. 
Russian support of Armenia during Nagorno-Karabakh conflict increased the 
tension between Russia and Azerbaijan. The Azeri government realized that its economic, 
political, and military independence from Russia relied on its energy resources, and for that 
reason it had to develop economic and security ties with Western powers. The Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) pipelines built by Azeri and Western 
oil companies sought to avoid Russian territory, creating a route that runs from Azerbaijan 
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to Georgia, Georgia to Turkey, and then from Turkey to Western markets. Once the pipeline 
started working at full capacity, the Azeri government received more than US$20 billion in 
revenues. From 2006 to 2008, Azeri revenues increased by almost a third every year.100 
The current Azeri oil fields under exploitation are Azeri, Chirag, and Guneshli (ACG), 
with estimated reserves estimated at five billion barrels of oil. By 1994, the Azeri president 
Heidar Aliyev and nine international oil companies101 signed the “Contract of the Century.” 
The companies involved in this contract came from six different countries including Russia 
and Turkey.102 Azeri authorities sought to use this contract to please global and regional 
powers without creating a chaotic relationship among all of them. Because the economics, 
politics, and national defense of Azerbaijan were under Russian influence after the collapse 
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of the Soviet Union, Heidar Aliyev had to negotiate carefully with Moscow, Washington, and 
Tehran in order to balance their interests over Azerbaijan and the South Caucasus region. 
Thus, Heidar Aliyev as an expert negotiator knew that Azeri independence would 
depend on bringing Russia and the Western powers to the South Caucasus region. The best 
way to achieve that goal was by creating an economic consortium where Western and non-
Western oil companies joined the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) in the 
exploitation and commercialization of Azeri energy resources. Thus, SOCAR and the 
principal oil companies from Great Britain, the US, Russia, Norway, and Turkey created the 
consortium Azerbaijan International Operation Company (AIOC). 103 The exclusion of Iran 
from this consortium created significant resentment among Iranian authorities because 
Baku and Tehran had signed an agreement before the establishment of the AIOC about 
Iranian participation in the new consortium, but American objections to the Iranian 
participation in the Contract of the Century forced Azerbaijan to remove Iran. President 
Aliyev understood the importance of the American and Iranian confrontational interests in 
the South Caucasus, and he used the Azeri-Iranian relationship to obtain some economic 
and political concessions from the US. This strategy also allowed Azerbaijan to gain some 
concessions from Iran, especially when Baku allowed American troops to stay near the 
Azeri-Iranian border, increasing the uncertainty about a possible American attack on Iran 
from Azeri soil.104 
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 For the transportation of Azeri oil and gas, the Iranian and Russian infrastructures 
represented viable outlets for the Azeri energy resources before Azerbaijan opted for the 
construction of the BTC and BTE. Iran proposed an oil swap to Azerbaijan. Since the quality 
of the Iranian oil is similar to the Azeri oil, Tehran offered to transport the Azeri oil from 
the southern regions of Azerbaijan to the northern provinces of Iran in order to satisfy the 
demands of Iranian consumption of oil, and in exchange Iran offered to export its own oil to 
international markets in favor of Azerbaijan.105 However, this offer did not satisfy US 
interests, and Azerbaijan had to refuse it. Another proposal was the Russian offer, which 
offered to transport Azeri oil through Russian pipelines from Baku to the Russian Black Sea 
port of Novorossiysk. Yet, Baku dismissed this option initially because it would increase 
Russian leverage over Azerbaijan by centralizing the commercialization of the Azeri oil, and 
Baku and Western authorities were focused on decreasing Moscow’s energy monopoly in 
order to increase Azerbaijan’s economic and political independence.  
Under these circumstances, a multiple-pipelines policy was implemented to ensure 
Azeri oil trade independence. Azerbaijan agreed to negotiate with Georgia the construction 
of an oil pipeline that runs from Baku to the Georgian port of Supsa in the Black Sea. By 
1998, the oil pipeline of Supsa began working, and it became the initial solution for the 
export of Azeri oil to international markets while avoiding Russian territory.106  
In 1998, following the policy of diversifying oil outlets, the Azeri government 
evaluated the Turkish offer of building a new pipeline that runs from Baku to Tbilisi and 
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then from Tbilisi to Ceyhan (BTC), reaching the Mediterranean sea in southern Turkey. 
This project presented significant political and environmental benefits. The oil transported 
to the Black Sea and then to the Mediterranean Sea had ecological risks, especially since the 
ships that carry the Azeri oil increased the transit over the Bosporus Strait and the risk of 
possible ship accidents in the Black Sea that could cause significant ecologic damage. On the 
other hand, the construction of the BTC, politically speaking, avoids the Russian territory, 
diminishing the Russian predominant position as an oil supplier for Europe and increasing 
the Azeri economic and political independence from Russia. However, the Azeri foreign 
policy based on multiple pipeline routes created fears of a military intervention in the 
aftermath of the Russia-Georgia war in 2008, when Russia invade Georgia. This military 
conflict in August 2008 created concern among the members of the AIOC consortium, when 
Georgia’s government and BP authorities decided to shut down the BTC pipeline as a 
preventive measure, fearing a possible Russian attack on the pipeline. 
Regardless the recent Russia-Georgia War in 2008, Russia has attempted to 
strengthen its economic and political ties with Azerbaijan in the South Caucasus, especially 
since Vladimir Putin became a president of Russia. The Russia-Georgia war in 2008 
represented a polemical approach made by Russia to the South Caucasus region. The 
Russian government reformulated its foreign policy regarding the Caucasus states since 
Vladimir Putin took power, seeking to strengthen the common interests that Russia shares 
with Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. This multi-vector policy developed under the Putin 
presidency did not find a great partner in Azerbaijan, especially after Russia threatened to 
attack the BTC oil pipeline. 
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Azerbaijan and its economic partners in the exploitation and commercialization of 
Azeri oil distrusted Russian intentions in the South Caucasus. Armenia, on the other hand, 
took advantage of the Russian-Azeri mistrust. Armenian authorities strengthened 
economic ties with Russia and Iran through energy agreements. The Russian government 
sponsored the construction of a gas pipeline that runs from Iran to Armenia, ensuring 
energy for Armenia. The strong Russia-Armenia relationship has concerned Azeri 
authorities since Russia supported Armenia during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and it 
increased the Azeri skepticism about the Russian intentions in the South Caucasus. 
The Azerbaijan-US relationship has affected the Russian interests in the Caucasus 
region and it promoted Russian hostility against Azerbaijan. The Russian-Azeri relationship 
improved when the Azeri government stated that Azerbaijan would not pursue 
membership in NATO as Georgia did. This measure showed the Azeri foreign policy’s 
pragmatism and flexibility in dealing with its neighbor states to ensure its survival.  
Therefore, the Azeri leaders proved to have the ability to design and re-design the 
Azeri policy based on new circumstances and needs. Azerbaijan has been able to balance 
global powers through diversified export of its energy resources and its geographical 
location. The multi-vector policy designed by Azerbaijan has allowed it to develop a 
cooperative policy with the global powers and its neighbor states, increasing political, 
economic, and military stability. Azerbaijan has developed a more pragmatic foreign policy 
than Georgia in the sense that Azeri authorities created a policy that avoids confrontations 
with global power and neighbor states. 
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4.2 The Azerbaijan-US Relationship 
4.2.1 Background 
 The significant growth of worldwide energy consumption raises question about 
control over energy resources. The international competition to obtain energy resources 
has become one of the major issues driving international relations. Under these 
circumstances, it seems that political and military intervention in countries that hold 
energy resources would become a widespread practice. The biggest military power on the 
earth, the US, seeks to ensure energy supplies for the coming decades due its increasing 
energy demand. This increasing demand will increase the American energy dependence on 
foreign oil and gas suppliers. This energy dependence has also significantly affected the 
Western European states and the new economic powers, China and India, which are also 
trying to diversify their energy suppliers in order to ensure their industrial and economic 
development. 
 After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Western powers, led by the US, attempted 
to get involved in the South Caucasus and Central Asia regions. The Western states initially 
promoted free markets, democracy, and rule of law in those regions. This approach 
changed when Western states and oil companies realized the revenues and power that they 
would gain by exploiting and trading Azeri oil and gas to international markets.  The Azeri 
oil and gas became one the most critical issues for US foreign policy when Western oil 
companies and the Azeri government signed the “Contract of the Century” in 1996 to 
exploit the Chirag-Guneshli oil field. This contract strengthened the commercial 
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relationship between Azerbaijan and the US, allowing American oil and industrial 
companies to develop different energy projects related to the energy industry, such as the 
construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) oil and gas 
pipelines, which bypass Russia. The Contract created the possibility that Azerbaijan could 
become an alternative oil and gas supplier for Western markets. 
 The terrorist attacks in Washington D.C. and New York on September 11, 2001, 
shifted American foreign policy in different aspects. Washington changed its approach to 
the South Caucasus, seeking to increase its influence in that region. The American strategy 
included increasing influence over the Azeri energy resources,107 reducing Russian 
leverage in the South Caucasus, decreasing Iranian influence in the region, balancing power 
among South Caucasus states, ensuring European diversification of energy suppliers, 
strengthening the role of international organizations in the region, and ensuring the spread 
of free markets, democracy, and rule of law.  
 The achievement of these goals depended on how the US redesigned its foreign 
policy, taking into account Azerbaijan’s landlocked geography and its energy resources. 
Washington realized that the Azeri government was aware of its geopolitical importance 
and had already taken advantage of that position, developing a pragmatic foreign policy 
balancing the US, Russia, and Iran.108  
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4.2.2 Energy Factors in the Relationship between Azerbaijan and the US 
In the early 1990’s, the US established diplomatic relationships with the new 
independent states of the South Caucasus region after the collapse of the Soviet Union. At 
the beginning, Washington did not have a definite policy regarding these states, so the US 
government developed bilateral relations with Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia 
independently. Washington had some difficulties delineating a coherent foreign policy with 
these states because the US was more focused on Russia than in the new independent 
states that emerged from the Soviet Union. The US, like the rest of the international 
community, was not ready to deal with a new reduced power, Russia, and with fifteen new 
unstable states. The American approach to the Caucasus states became more complicated 
due to the Americans’ lack of information about the geography, history, politics, and culture 
of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia. Thus, when the US decided to deal with Azerbaijan 
and the other two South Caucasus states, it struggled to determine the best strategy for 
advancing US interests because American authorities did not have a strong understanding 
of the role and influence of each of those states in the region.109 
 During the Clinton administration, Washington pursued political, economic, and 
military stability in the South Caucasus region by spreading democracy, free markets, and 
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liberal values. Those measures attempt to ensure the flow of the Caspian oil and gas to 
international markets (excluding Iran from the energy business), decrease Russia’s 
dominant position as a military power and energy supplier110  to the Western markets,111 
help Western European states to diversify their oil and gas suppliers, and increase 
American leverage in the South Caucasus region. 
 The American economic/energy approach to Azerbaijan began in the early 1990’s 
when the principal American oil companies signed the first contract with the Azeri 
government to exploit and export Azeri energy resources. The geopolitical importance of 
Azerbaijan to US interests persuaded Washington to begin a broader involvement in the 
South Caucasus region. The political, economic, and military roles of Russia, Iran, and 
Turkey in the South Caucasus region became the main concern for Washington, and the US 
had to adapt its foreign policy to contain Russia and Iran by supporting Turkey in the early 
1990’s.112   
 The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, brought a new perspective on how the 
Americans approached the South Caucasus region. When president George W. Bush began 
the War on Terror, the American government sought different access points to Central Asia 
to deal with the terrorist groups hosted in Afghanistan. The first American military 
deployments began at the end of September 2001 when NATO and the US established 
military air bases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, and when they positioned military forces 
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in Tajikistan.113  Moscow leaders expressed their support for the American War on Terror 
and for the American military campaigns against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces in 
Afghanistan. The Russian support of Washington included military assistance, intelligence 
support, military equipment, and military advice in Central Asia.114 
 Once the US government discovered the potential for Azeri energy resources to 
increase its influence over world markets, the US sought to diversify its energy suppliers. 
Washington realized that in the coming decades, Asian countries, especially China and 
India, would increase their energy demand due to their constant economic and industrial 
growth, and that growing demand would create a complex competition for energy 
resources. 
 Because the price of oil and gas responds to fluctuations between supply and 
demand, that price has been unstable, and that instability is likely to intensify in the coming 
years due to the increasing demand for energy resources in Asia and the potential military 
confrontations in the Middle East. 115 Oil and gas as global products respond to the market's 
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rules instead of political tendencies. During the Clinton presidency, the US developed a 
cohesive policy to spread democracy, free markets, and rule of law in the former Soviet 
republics, which became new independent states. This policy based on political and 
economic cooperation116 also sought to mitigate regional military conflicts, seeking to 
integrate the new independent states with the international community, where they can 
embrace liberal-democratic values. 117 
 These liberal initiatives, however, did not benefit Azerbaijan at the beginning, 
especially after the American Congress issued the Freedom Support Act in 1992.118 The 
American Congress included the Section 907 in the Act, and it stated that Azerbaijan would 
not receive any assistance from the US until the Azeri government demonstrates that it is 
working to cease all blockades and other offensive uses of force against Armenia and the 
Nagorno-Karabakh region.119  The inconsistency of Section 907 appeared when the 
Security Council of the United Nations issued a resolution condemning the Armenian 
occupation of the Azeri territories. 120 
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 Clinton was aware of the negative consequences of Section 907 for the American 
national and global interests, and he advocated its repeal to protect American interests in 
the South Caucasus region. However, he did not gain enough support in the Congress to 
revoke it during his presidential term. After the terrorist attacks in Washington D.C. and 
New York in September 2011, president George W. Bush revoked the Section 907 of the 
Freedom Support Act, improving the economic, political, and military relationship between 
the US and Azerbaijan.  
 The US and Azerbaijan based their economic relationship on the exploitation and 
export of Azeri oil and gas to international markets. Once the Western oil companies began 
negotiations with Azeri authorities about the energy resources of Azerbaijan, Washington 
designed a specific foreign policy focused on advancing the Western influence in the trade 
of Azeri oil and gas. The American incursion into the energy business in Azerbaijan 
included the design and construction of new pipeline routes, which would bypass the 
Russian territory in order to decrease the Russian leverage over Azeri energy. The major 
American pipeline project was the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline,121 which became the 
second longest pipeline in the world at a length of 1,110 miles and with an investment of $4 
billion.122 The complexity of the development of this pipeline project did not only lie in the 
cost of its construction but in the consensus that Azerbaijan had to achieve with Georgia 
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and Turkey to build the pipeline that would run through those two transit states, 
generating a revenue of around $20 billion for Azerbaijan.  The BTC pipeline attempted to 
put Azerbaijan on the world energy map and create one of the fastest growing economies 
in the world.   
 The economic relations between Washington and Baku included the participation of 
both Ankara and Tbilisi for the development of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which 
takes oil from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean Sea and Western markets. This 
pipeline put Azerbaijan on the world energy map and within the international economic 
system. 
 In the political field, the construction of the BTC, on one hand, benefited Azerbaijan 
by increasing its political and economic autonomy from Russia, improving Azeri 
relationships with Western states, strengthening the Azeri position in the South Caucasus 
relative to Georgia and Armenia, ensuring Azeri economic growth, and balancing the 
regional and global powers in the South Caucasus to Azerbaijan’s benefit. On the other 
hand, the political benefits for America included decreasing the Russian hegemonic 
position as an energy supplier; increasing American involvement in the economy, politics, 
military of the South Caucasus region; diversifying Western energy suppliers; decreasing 
Iranian influence in the energy resources of the South Caucasus region; and increasing 
Turkey’s influence in the region. 
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4.2.3 Military Factors in the Relationship between Azerbaijan and the US 
 The first American approach to Azerbaijan was vague in the sense that Washington 
did not develop a clear foreign policy toward the South Caucasus region in the early 1990’s. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union generated new independent states, which attempted to 
consolidate their independence from Russia, seeking new allies and investors to balance 
the predominant Russian influence in the region. By 1993 and 1994, the Azeri and Kazakh 
governments and the principal US oil companies began signing the first oil contracts, 
opening the South Caucasus and Caspian Sea energy resources to American interests.123  
 The US used liberal measures to approach Azerbaijan in two different ways. The 
first American approach was unilateral, seeking bilateral compromises in energy and 
military aspects, while the second approach was multilateral through international 
organizations, such as the UN, the OSCE,124 and NATO. In both approaches, the US 
government used economic and military means to increase its influence over Azerbaijan, 
mediating in military conflicts in Georgia (Abkhazia, Ajdaria, and South Ossetia) as well as 
Azerbaijan and Armenia (Nagorno-Karabakh). The American involvement sought to 
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internationalize125 those conflicts by engaging the international community for the benefit 
of the South Caucasus states and Western powers.  
 The American military presence in the South Caucasus region increased after the 
deployment of American troops in the region during mid-1990’s. The international 
community’s participation in the resolution of the Azeri-Armenian conflicts hid the US 
involvement in the region. The American participation in the Caucasus conflicts through 
international organizations allowed Washington to avoid confrontation with Russia in any 
conflict-resolution process in the South Caucasus region. Since international organizations 
are working together with the Azeri, Armenian, Georgian, American, and Russian 
authorities to solve the military conflicts in the region, any military confrontation between 
the US and Russia would mean a direct confrontation against the international 
organizations, and that would likely affect the Russian image in the international 
community. 126 
 The Azeri government supported the US military campaign against Al-Qaeda in 
Afghanistan providing access to its airspace, since transit over Iranian air space was 
unthinkable, and transit over Russian airspace was limited. The US-Azeri relationship 
reached a new level when the American Congress waived Section 907of the Freedom 
Support Act and encouraged Baku to support American military intervention in Iraq by 
sending Azeri troops.127 Washington, for its part, increased its participation in Azeri energy 
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projects, such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which increased the Azeri economic, 
political, and military independence and influence in the region. 
 The geographical distance between the US and the South Caucasus states reduces 
the risk of any military attack against the US, and it has provided Washington some 
distance to analyze and adapt its foreign policy to the current reality of the South Caucasus 
and Caspian Sea regions. Evaluating the American-Azeri relationship also requires 
attention to the American intention of monitoring Russian and Iranian policies regarding 
Azerbaijan’s energy resources.  
 The current American grand strategy depends on basic goals, which go along with 
the selective engagement strategy.128 This strategy relies on Washington's defense of US 
national interests through effective use of its military power. This military power has 
served the national interests successfully, not only defending the American territory but 
also its political, economic, and military interests all over the world. Thus, the notion that 
military force no longer serves American interests is false.129 Although the international 
order seems to become more interdependent with the spread of democracy, free markets, 
human rights, and the rule of law, it does not mean that states should not have efficient 
military forces, especially in a world where there is no global government institution with a 
significant military power to enforce its decisions.  
                                                                                                                                                             
foreign state but became dependent on a new kind of influence, the American one. Cornell, "The Politicization 
of Islam,” 30-31. 
128 Robert J. Art, America's Grand Strategy and World Politics (New York: Routledge, 2009), 234. 
129 Art, America's Grand Strategy, 7. 
78 
 The American primary interests130 are (1) preventing an attack on the American 
homeland; (2) preventing war and security competition among the Eurasian great powers; 
(3) maintaining secure oil supplies in oil-rich Gulf states and the Caspian Sea; and (4) 
supporting the spread of democracy, free markets, rule of law, global institutions, and 
liberal values. To achieve all of these goals, Washington has been applying realist and 
liberal measures. For instance, the American attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq represent a 
realist response to the military threats that Washington faced on September 2001, 
especially due to the circumstances in which Washington decided to wage those wars 
avoiding the UN Security Council’s decision. The liberal aspect of the wars in Afghanistan 
and Iraq lies in the arguments elaborated by Washington officials stating the importance of 
spreading democracy, human rights, free markets, and rule of law in Central Asia and the 
Middle East. 
 Within the primary American interests, Eurasia is one of the most important regions 
for the US foreign policy. A war between two superpowers is not impossible in Eurasia, but 
it is unlikely to happen. A war between South Caucasus states is likely to occur, as it did 
when Armenia invaded Azerbaijan in 1990, where global and regional powers, such as the 
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US, the EU, Russia, and China, could increase the already exiting political and military 
instability in the region. For instance, during the Nagorno-Karabakh War, Russia militarily 
supported Armenia against Azerbaijan,131 showing its interests in regaining its status as a 
global and regional power, keeping its territorial integrity, and increasing its influence in 
the Caspian Sea energy markets. 132  
 The American political, economic, and military support for Azerbaijan and Georgia, 
on the other hand, has not reached the level that can compromise the American 
involvement in any possible military confrontation against Russia. For instance, the Russia-
Georgia War of August 2008 did not involve the US or Western European military 
participation, leaving Georgia alone. Even, the official statement made by the Georgian 
president Shevardnadze in 2002 about his country’s intention of seeking full NATO 
membership did not receive Western support during the war. Indeed, even the US’s official 
endorsement of the admission of Georgia as new NATO member in 2007, through the 
Freedom Consolidation Act,133 did not persuade Washington to get involved in the Russia-
Georgia War.  
 After the Azeri-Armenian conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, the US government 
provided military training and weapons to Azerbaijan through NATO. The Partnership for 
Peace (PfP) program, one of the main NATO programs in the South Caucasus region, sought 
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to improve Azeri military capabilities, training Azeri officials for NATO peacekeeping and 
humanitarian operations.134 Since political and military instability were the rule in the 
South Caucasus region, the PfP program attempted to bring security and stability to the 
region, encouraging prosperity and democratization through economic development.135 
 The PfP program encouraged Azerbaijan and Georgia to strengthen ties with 
Western states, pursuing a significant partnership with NATO and increasing the Azeri and 
Georgian expectation of becoming a NATO member, which would ensure their political, 
economic, and military independence from Russia. Another program led by the US 
government was the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, which 
sought to prevent illicit transfer of nuclear materials through the Caspian region. The Azeri 
commitment to work together with NATO in the South Caucasus made possible that 250 
NATO servicemen arrived in Azerbaijan in August 2000 to protect the southern Azeri 
border, due to the possible Iranian military attack after Tehran planned to deploy more 
than 6,000 soldiers, 75 tanks and vehicles, and fighter aircraft to the Azeri-Iranian 
border.136   
 In brief, Washington has sponsored different military and economic programs in the 
South Caucasus and Caspian Sea regions, and Azerbaijan has represented one of the key 
strategic states for American economic and military interests. This was reflected in 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright statement to the US Congress that US foreign policy 
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should focus on strategic locations that are energy-rich,137 seeking to diversify American 
energy suppliers that rely on trade routes through the Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf 
and the Bosporus Strait in Turkey.138 By developing economic, political, and military ties 
with Azerbaijan, Washington not only reduced the Russian hegemonic position in the 
energy trade, but also contained Iranian influence in the Caspian Sea's energy resources.  
Azeri geography and energy resources became crucial factors for American foreign 
policy in the South Caucasus and Eurasia. Azerbaijan has used its economic partnership 
with the US to balance Russia, and this balance allowed Azerbaijan to gain economic 
stability, ensuring the transportation of Azeri energy resources to international markets 
while bypassing Russian territory. This American-Azeri economic partnership has gone 
along with a military partnership that attempted to strength the Azeri military forces 
through military trainings and the sale of weapons. The military links between Azerbaijan 
and the US showed the increasing American influence and role in Azerbaijan and in the 
South Caucasus. Therefore, the US and Azerbaijan’s economic and military relationship 
affects the American approach to the Caucasus region, and that also influences the Azeri 
foreign policy due to the Russian factor. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS 
This research has evaluated how Azerbaijan’s landlocked geography, its energy 
resources, and the global powers’ competition for influence affect the independence of 
Azeri foreign policy. Azerbaijan’s landlocked position connecting Europe and Asia sets 
physical limitations on its ability to export its energy resources to the Western markets. 
Azerbaijan has attempted to enhance its economic, political, and military 
independence from Russia, developing a multi-vector foreign policy to balance global 
powers in the South Caucasus region through cooperative economic and military measures. 
Among these cooperative military measures are the Azeri-Russian agreements over the 
Russian radar station in Gabala and the Azeri-US cooperation through the Partnership for 
Peace program developed by NATO. These agreements have ensured military stability 
between Azerbaijan and its neighbor states. 
Another feature of the Azeri landlocked state is the influence that transit states have 
over the Azeri energy trade. Since Azerbaijan lacks an outlet to the sea, its energy resources 
have to transit over Russia, Georgia, Iran, and Turkey to reach international markets. These 
transit states could constrict Azeri foreign policy due their geographical locations and 
access to international seas. The Azeri government implemented a sophisticated energy 
relationship with Georgia, Turkey, and Russia to reinforce its multi-vector policy, ensuring 
diverse routes to export Azeri oil and gas to international markets, thus reducing the 
influence of any single regional partner or global power.  
Azeri oil and gas play a key role in Azerbaijan’s economic development. After the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, Baku sought to consolidate its independence from Russia by 
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exporting its energy resources to Western markets. Azeri oil and gas became a tool to 
increase Azerbaijan’s leverage in the energy market. The Western states were part of the 
Azeri plan for bringing together global and regional powers to balance Russia and Iran, 
creating four major outcomes that encouraged the political, economic, and military 
involvement of Western powers: 1) allowing Western states to diversify their energy 
suppliers, 2) increasing the American influence over European and South Caucasus states, 
3) compelling Russia to redesign its energy policy with Azerbaijan, and 4) increasing 
Iranian interests in the commercialization of Azeri energy resources. 
Economic agreements based on energy have strengthened the Azeri relationship 
with its neighbor states and global powers. Georgia and Armenia, in a regional perspective, 
have seen in Azeri natural resources an opportunity to improve their fragile economies. 
These states, as is the case for many other former Soviet republics, depended on Russia as 
an energy supplier for decades, and the collapse of the Soviet Empire created different 
opportunities and challenges for those new independent states. In the cases of Georgia and 
Armenia, the Azeri energy resources represented an opportunity to gain economic benefit 
for the transit fee that Azerbaijan would pay for transporting its oil and gas through these 
countries to international markets, so both states sought to consolidate their economic ties 
with Azerbaijan. The military conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan eliminated the 
Armenian chances to become a transit state for the Azeri energy resources. This conflict 
benefited Georgia, which became the official transit state for the Azeri oil and gas that run 
from Azerbaijan to Georgia, then from Georgia to Turkey, and finally from Turkey to 
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Western markets. Thus, Georgia and Turkey became the pro-Western transit states for 
Azeri energy resources. 
Global powers, on the other hand, have attempted to diversify their energy suppliers 
to meet their economic goals. The Western European states' energy dependency on 
Russian and Middle Eastern energy is a clear example of the significance of the Azeri oil and 
gas for Western markets. By strengthening energy ties with Western states, Azerbaijan 
obtains assistance with economic matters (free markets, international financial aid), 
politics (democratization, human rights, conflict resolution assistance regarding the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and rule of law), and security (military training, military 
equipment, and weapons), strengthening Azerbaijan’s independence from Russia. 
 Azerbaijan’s role as a producer and exporter of oil and natural gas delineated the 
global and regional importance of Azerbaijan for international politics. The power that 
Western states (especially the US), Turkey, Georgia, and Russia have over Azeri energy 
resources is significant due to the capacity of these states to affect Azeri energy policy. 
Baku authorities are also aware of the power that foreign oil companies have in the 
exploitation and export of Azeri oil and gas to international markets, as is the case with 
British Petroleum, which operates the major Azeri pipelines and oil and gas fields. 
Therefore, the Azeri government has to maintain good relationships with all its major 
economic partners and investors (the US, the UK, and Russia), and its transit states (Russia, 
Georgia, Turkey, and Iran), creating a balance among regional and global powers in order 
to achieve stability and economic prosperity. 
85 
The competition between global powers, namely the US and Russia, for influence in 
the South Caucasus region also affects the development of Azeri foreign policy. Azerbaijan, 
as a landlocked state, needs economic and military partners to strengthen its independence 
from Russia, balancing the regional and global powers in the Caucasus. The US-Russia 
competition for influence in the South Caucasus region created two groups: pro-Western 
states and non-pro-Western states. The first group, led by the US includes Western 
European states, Turkey, and Georgia, while the second group, led by Russia, includes Iran 
and Armenia. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the new independent states of the Caucasus 
region attempted to strengthen their economic and military independence from Russia by 
seeking economic and military partnerships with the US. The exploitation and 
commercialization of Azeri energy resources in the early 1990’s became the first reason for 
American involvement in Azerbaijan. 
Washington sponsored military and economic programs in the South Caucasus and 
Caspian Sea regions because Azerbaijan represented a key strategic state for American 
economic and military interests. As American Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stated, 
the US has to diversify its energy suppliers from the Middle East, and it has to develop 
economic, political, and military ties with countries like Azerbaijan, which has a strategic 
location which is rich in oil and gas. 
By developing economic, political, and military ties with Azerbaijan, Washington not 
only diminished Russia’s hegemonic position in the energy trade, but it also sought to 
contain the increasing interest of Iran in Azeri energy resources. The American 
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involvement in Azerbaijan relies not only on the bilateral relations between Azerbaijan and 
the US government, but also on multilateral relations between Azerbaijan and international 
organizations, such as NATO and the OSCE, which indirectly increase the influence of 
Washington in the South Caucasus region through economic and military support. These 
American approaches, bilateral and multilateral, provide significant freedom to 
Washington to shift its foreign policy with Azerbaijan without engaging in meaningful 
commitments. 
On the non-pro-Western side, Russia has been the principal energy supplier for 
European states for decades, and it has increased Moscow’s leverage over Western states. 
The exploitation and export of Azeri oil and gas to Western markets and the American 
incursion in the Azeri energy industry threaten Russia’s hegemonic position as a supplier 
of oil and gas to Western markets. The development of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline for 
transporting oil and the South Caucasus Pipeline for transporting gas are clear examples of 
the pro-Western energy policy developed by the Azeri government.  
However, Russia committed itself to regaining its status as an unchallengeable 
economic and military power in the South Caucasus. The Russia-Georgia War in August 
2008 represented a clear example of how Moscow’s military power overwhelms Western 
economic and military aid to the Caucasus states. It also depicted how committed Russia is 
to extending its influence in the region through either cooperative policies and soft power 
or coercive means and hard power. 
The presence of Western states and companies in Azerbaijan increased Russian 
concerns about Western economic and security expansion into the Russian sphere of 
87 
influence. In order to increase Russia’s leverage in these regions, Moscow designed a 
bilateral and multilateral policy where supranational organizations, such as the Russia-led 
CIS, played a key role in the affairs of Central Asia and the Caucasus.  
In the security aspect, Russia supported Armenia during the military conflict in 
Nagorno-Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This Russian approach increased the 
Azeri mistrust of Moscow, and it divided the regional powers’ support regarding 
Azerbaijan. Turkey gave military and economic support to Azerbaijan by providing 
weapons and closing the Turkish-Armenian border, while Iran initially supported Armenia 
and then took diplomatic measures to mediate in the conflict.  
The geographic location of Russia provides Moscow with a significant power over 
the landlocked territory of Azerbaijan, which is compelled by its geography to maintain 
close relations with Russia. Azerbaijan has to keep outstanding relations with Moscow in 
particular because Russia has an integrated pipeline system for transporting Azeri oil and 
gas to Western markets, and the military capability to initiate a military confrontation with 
any neighbor-state, as happened in 2008 with Georgia. 
Therefore, since Russia is ready to increase its influence in Azerbaijan’s energy 
business and regain its position as an unchallengeable global power, Baku has to keep a 
close relationship with Moscow, balancing the regional and global powers in order to 
consolidate economic development and military stability. This means that Azeri foreign 
policy is affected by Russian economic and military measures in the South Caucasus region. 
In brief, this research work has demonstrated that Azerbaijan’s landlocked 
geography, its energy resources, and the global powers’ competition for influence in the 
88 
South Caucasus affect the independence of Azeri foreign policy. Thus, the Azeri government 
has to keep excellent relationships with its principal economic partners and investors (the 
US, the UK, and Russia), and its transit states (Russia, Georgia, Turkey, and Iran), balancing 
the power among regional and global powers in order to achieve political stability and 
economic prosperity. 
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